# AFF AT: CP—DoS SA

### Perm: Do CP – 2AC

#### Perm: do counterplan – it’s plan-plus:

#### “Increase” is gross NOT net

Goldberg 19 Mitchell S. Goldberg, Judge, delivering the Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Shire ViroPharma, Inc. v. CSL Behring LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198992, 11-18-2019, NexisUni /GoGreen!

**[FOOTNOTE 14]**

Defendants' citation to AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Ltd., No. 05-5553, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48844, 2010 WL 11414548, at \*13 (D.N.J. May 18, 2010) is inapposite. In that case, the court construed the term "increased average plasma levels (AUC) per dosage unit" to mean "greater blood levels of (-)-omeprazole . . . compared to the typical or usual blood levels for omeprazole." 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48844, [WL] at \*13. The court found such a construction necessary because the claim term "increased average plasma levels" provided no point of reference on which to determine what were "increased average plasma levels." Id.

By contrast here, the claim language provides a point of reference regarding what the term "increase" means by noting that the level of active C1 esterase in the blood must "increase" to "at least about 0.4 U/mL" regardless of where the C1-INH level started. Contrary to Defendants' argument, Plaintiff's refusal to accord any additional meaning to the term "increases" does not violate any well-settled canons of claim construction.

#### “Cooperation” includes “assistance” under State control – prefer legal precision

Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf> /GoGreen!

Terminology

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD formally defines security assistance as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

DOD uses the overarching term “security cooperation” to denote the State Department security assistance administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8

### Perm: Do CP – 1AR

#### This is the DoD definition all of their ev and ours is referencing

DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, <https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf> /GoGreen!

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

**country-specific security cooperation section**. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

**Integrated Country Strategy**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

**international agreements**. Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.

**defense institution building**. Defined in DoDD 5205.82.

**SCOs**. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions. SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.

**senior defense official/defense attaché**. The chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official/defense attaché in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attaché or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

**security assistance**. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

**security sector assistance**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

#### Yes legal precision – Title 10 of U.S. Code confirms the DoD definition

DoD 21 Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, <https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf> /GoGreen!

Introduction

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day-to-day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD)-funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. In order for U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments to better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998.

In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs while also leading the wider USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs), or the military departments (MILDEPs). Further complicating the management of security cooperation was the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation. This point of contact was either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)- sponsored Defense Attaché Office (DAO) or the DSCA-sponsored Security Cooperation Office (SCO). These two spigots of security cooperation within a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD, its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations.

On 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

According to Title 10 U.S. Code Section 301, the term “security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Other DoD policy statements identify DoD-managed or administered security assistance programs as components of security cooperation.

The purpose of this first chapter is to provide definitions of the various programs within security assistance and the broader area of security cooperation.

#### Most comprehensive independent review of both cooperation and assistance authorities agrees

GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-255r.pdf> /GoGreen!

House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.

**[FOOTNOTE 4]**

4 Various government and nongovernment entities have compiled lists of security cooperation efforts, including security assistance efforts administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), but none of the lists are sanctioned by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as both current and complete.

**[/FOOTNOTE 4]**

To develop an inventory of BPC security cooperation and security assistance efforts, we reviewed data, documents, and reports from DOD, State, RAND, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS); conducted searches of laws; and reviewed prior GAO reports. We interviewed DOD, State, RAND, and CRS officials about their research on, and listings of, security cooperation and security assistance efforts used for BPC and the efforts’ associated authorities; the methodologies they used; and the limitations they encountered. The efforts we selected for our inventory comprise what our sources referred to as “programs,” “subprograms,” “tools,” “funding accounts,” “authorities,” or “activities.” We used “efforts” as the most inclusive possible term, because the DOD and DOD-sponsored sources we consulted used undefined and varying terminology—for example, sometimes using terms such as “programs” and “activities” interchangeably and sometimes including funds and the names of authorities—and because these sources and DOD officials did not provide DOD-sanctioned definitions of the program and subprogram levels for security cooperation programs. We broadly defined building partner capacity to include efforts that were intended solely to build partner security capacity as well as those that could have a partial or ancillary effect on partner security capacity. For example, we included military exercises, training, and equipment as well as BPC-related personnel exchanges and military contacts. To focus our inventory on BPC efforts to address security-related threats, we excluded efforts whose sole purpose was humanitarian, health, disaster, or development assistance. To eliminate duplicative and expired efforts, we compared the data we obtained from these sources and reviewed associated authorities. We worked with DOD and State officials to resolve any discrepancies, to add additional efforts, and to group subefforts with overall efforts when the officials made such information available. See enclosure I for further information about our objective, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to March 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

### Perm: Do Both – 2AC

#### Perm: do plan and the non-mutually-exclusive parts of the counterplan – “slippery slope” is a fallacy, NOT a link – fiat shields it

#### There’s no functional difference – especially if they include DoD implementation

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, <http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf> /GoGreen!

“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.

### AT: NB – AT: Militarization Link

#### No net benefit – “militarization” is fake news – the structural irrelevance of diplomats in the face of technological change – NOT authority – is what matters

Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2018/03/militarization-and-marginalization-of-american-diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/> /GoGreen!

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the career service, often to key posts. In this new Trump administration, politicians or business friends of the President have already been appointed to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing and London, continuing a practice which goes back across the last five or six presidencies. Even more disturbing from a career Foreign Service point of view is the Administration’s decision to appoint a non-career Director General of the Foreign Service, for the first time in the Department’s history.

For all that, Ms. Priest may have overstated her case. From interviews which I and my colleague Dr. Shoon Murray carried out last year with over 20 recently retired ambassadors from all corners of the globe, we found that almost all said they welcomed these military resources. They did not feel that the occasional high visibility visits of combatant commanders undermined their authority or access to the key players in the host government. They saw local officials on a regular, even daily basis, while the combatant commander would come through the capital city once or twice a year. Indeed, they saw these generals and admirals as allies in a common cause. One general went so far as to require his senior staff to wear buttons which proclaimed “One Team, One Fight” to ensure the complementarity of the military and diplomatic roles. There were, to be sure, tensions, but they arose largely from personal friction between the Ambassador and the Combatant Commander about style and not over issues of regional or bilateral policy.

Nonetheless for at least 15 years policy analysts have been asserting that this growth in military power and influence has harmed American foreign policy. It is currently fashionable to say that if your only policy tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail. Critics of the status quo assert that the increasingly capable and well-funded military has become the instrument of choice when action has to be taken to deal with any crisis anywhere in the world.

What is certainly true is that the military and its parent the Department of Defense have enjoyed resources far in excess of what the State Department enjoys. Ten times as much in fact. With resources comes capability. Although in recent years the Defense Department budget has been constrained, it has always been vastly greater than the budget of the civilian foreign affairs agencies including the State Department, the Agency for International Development, The Voice of America and others. The current administration intends to substantially increase funding for the military and to give it even greater capabilities to respond to looming crises in North Korea, Iran, Ukraine and the Middle East, to name only a few of the front burner crisis situations that are engrossing the attention of President Trump and his team. The military will get more hardware. Our nuclear capabilities will be substantially modernized.

At the same time Diplomacy is being marginalized. The State Department and American Diplomacy face radical reorganization and resource shortages, both in budgetary and human terms, which will surely mean dislocations and in the short term loss of operational effectiveness. In addition, The Trump administration has proposed a thirty percent cut in its budget. Foreign assistance is to be greatly reduced and USAID potentially abolished or folded into the State Department. In terms of personnel over one hundred of our most senior officers, both men and women have gone into retirement and several hundred more are being offered buyouts to persuade them to take early retirement. This hollowing out of the diplomatic capabilities of the United States can will not bring us closer to peace or a resolution of any of the most important crises which we face. Diplomacy, by its very nature, involves using the skills of imagination, information and engagement to create win-win solutions for all the participants. All of this requires training and years of experience in the field. For the military the outcome usually must be one-sided; victory for us, defeat for them.

What has all this meant in practical terms in terms of the Washington policy debate?

The Trump administration and to a large extent the Republican Party regard the eight years of the Obama administration as one in which America failed to exert its traditional leadership role. They were horrified when Obama was quoted during the Libyan crisis as saying that America would lead from behind; that is, behind our European allies. They criticized his decision to pull combat troops out of Iraq as premature and were critical when he seemed poised to do the same in Afghanistan. These were not trivial concerns. The State Department was seen to be the agent of a ‘spineless’ foreign policy, always ready to compromise even at the expense of vital American interests. Republicans saw the nuclear agreement with Iran as proof that diplomacy was an inadequate first line of defense for the United States. The State Department and its political allies in the Democratic party repeatedly called for greater use of diplomatic and soft power tools to advance American national interests.

The result is that for a substantial number of American voters the Democrats were seen as the party of weakness and withdrawal. President Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” is a reflection of this view. His slogan also implies that for America to regain its traditional leadership role it will have to demonstrate that it has a more muscular foreign policy. The military will be needed as never before.

At the National Security Council, where foreign and security policies are coordinated and policy papers prepared for the President, the first of Trump’s national security advisors went out of his way to recruit active duty military officers to fill many of the key positions. He made it clear that what the President wanted was a policy staff with real world experience of war, who understood the importance and uses of hard power and who were capable of keeping at bay the limp-wristed forces of compromise of the State Department’s diplomats. It seemed that soft power was out and hard power in.

In all fairness it should be noted that the Democrats were not always champions of the Foreign Service. The numbers of political appointees to ambassadorial positions reached a record high towards the end of the Obama administration. The appointment of political appointees in the Department went down five or six levels in the bureaucracy in order to assure that the president’s priorities would be carried out. If Republicans tended to think that diplomats were limp-wristed and liberal, the Democrats often saw them as doctrinaire conservatives unwilling to move with the liberal currents of the time.

Ironically one of the greatest defenders of the Foreign Service was the last general to be Secretary of State, Colin Powell. He pushed through a diplomatic readiness initiative which substantially increased the number of Foreign Service Officers and for the first time created a ‘float’ that enabled more officer to receive training.

The overall situation, however, is not so clear. Two of America’s most distinguished diplomats Ryan Crocker and Nicholas Burns recently drew attention to the hollowing out of American diplomacy in an article earlier this week in the New York times. They pointed out that “the United States is facing an extraordinary set of national security challenges. While we count on our military ultimately to defend the country, our diplomats are with it on front lines and in dangerous places around the world. They are our lead negotiators as we work with our European allies in NATO to contain growing Russian power on the Continent. They are our lead negotiators seeking a peaceful end to the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Our diplomats are assembling the coalition of countries in East Asia to counter the irresponsible regime of the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un.”

They are almost certainly right.

The traditional view of decision-making is that civilians do policy creation and definition and to a large extent carry it out. Only in extreme situation is the military called in to execute the policy. But what happens when both the Secretary of Defense, traditionally a civilian, and the national Security Advisor are both military men. The danger is clearly that military values and capabilities will come to dominate the policy debate. This arrangement seems to imply that military men will seek military solutions to problems that need diplomatic solutions.

However, many experts point out that the military worldview is essentially conservative. Historically presidents have found it hard to persuade the military to take action. All too often the Pentagon raises issues of resources, timing, capabilities and emphasizes the difficulty of taking action rather than the desirability of rushing to engage. They will do what they are told to do, but they are surprisingly risk averse. The lessons of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have not been lost on them. They shy away from options that require boots on the ground. Hence the paralysis of American policy in Syria.

Pulling in the opposite direction is the revolution in military capabilities and the more frequent use of remote technologies which put few American lives at risk. Stand-off weapons facilitated by satellite or drone control seem relatively safe and often are recommended to the President as appropriate means of punishing international malefactors and terrorists. These rapidly evolving technologies probably contribute more to the militarization of American foreign policy than the question of whether those in charge wear uniforms or not. President Trump’s use of cruise missiles again a single airfield in Syria was a sign of this trend.

The discussion of resources is, in fact, complex. The military establishment frequently complains that it lacks the resources, whether in terms of manpower or equipment to fulfill the many tasks which the President wants it to carry out, particularly when the time frame for action is short. Military doctrine calls for the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously. That, of course, requires an ability to deploy an extraordinary range of land, sea and air forces. That well may be beyond the current capabilities of U.S. forces.

Yet civilians and diplomats, ambassadors in particular, also complain bitterly about the dramatic shortage of resources available for diplomacy. The dramatic decline in morale in the State Department reflects the perception that the political elite does not value diplomatic skills or the expertise which diplomats bring to the table. One recently retired senior Foreign Service Officer told a group several weeks ago that the atmosphere inside the State Department was one of “chaos and fear”. Hiring freezes, budget cuts, politicization of the senior policy levels in the State Department all point to this decline in respect for the core skills of diplomacy. Diplomats are, as I have indicated, too often seen as politically biased and, in the present context viscerally hostile to the President. The fact that last year over one hundred retired Ambassadors signed a letter calling on the American people to vote against President Trump only deepened the perception of potential disloyalty. Several recent dissent memoranda about the withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and of the failure to list Burma, Iraq and Afghanistan on the list of countries employing child soldiers have further fueled the distrust of the Foreign Service.

Nonetheless the senior military leadership and the top civilians at the Pentagon continue to be outspoken in their support for more resources for the State Department. They, unlike their political leaders, see diplomacy as the first line of defense. The military knows that it will be called in only when diplomacy has failed.

In sum, we are not facing a militarization of American foreign policy but the marginalization of diplomacy as the effective alternative to military force. The denigration and dismissal of soft power, even when it is renamed smart power, has led to a perception of diplomatic weakness and the concomitant rise of military influence on the policy process. It is a sad reality that there are more and more hammers in the policy toolbox and fewer alternative weapons. The result may be that a president anxious to make America great again and to demonstrate the effectiveness of American leadership and power may look for a place of his choosing to demonstrate American power. President Trump does not seem temperamentally interested in the prolonged and protracted process of diplomacy. His recent tweet questioning the utility of Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to engage the North Koreans in dialogue is an example of this skepticism. In these circumstances we should not be surprised if the United States were to decide to choose a target of opportunity in Iran or North Korea or Syria to show off its military might. This will not reflect the institutional militarization of American foreign policy but rather the emotional need of many Americans, frustrated by our loss of global standing to demonstrate that America can indeed be great again. Neither a resourced military nor a marginalized diplomacy should want that to happen.

### AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

#### No leverage link – prefer studies

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060022.pdf> /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

Does U.S. SA support host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA can help prevent democratic backsliding, but it does not actively support democratization in the way that it is typically designed and resourced. If the United States supported host nation democratization via its inspirational democratic example (e.g., protecting human rights and individual liberties), then U.S. SA was not the conduit for broadcasting the U.S. democratic example. The evidence showed that two spikes in U.S. SA (between 0.8% and 1.4% of host nation GDP) were quickly followed by increases in democratization, but the largest spike in U.S. SA (upwards of 1.52% of host nation GDP, and conditioned on democracy-related reforms) did not increase democratization. 590 If aid conditionality supports host nation democratization, then the case studies indicate that the threshold is between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP.591 The evidence in both cases supported the idea that U.S. SA reinforced host nation security, which helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding, though it did not increase democratization. If U.S. security sector assistance generally supports host nation security sector reform—which then improved its civil-military relations and democratic governance—then the case studies indicated the threshold is above 10.5% of annual U.S. SA to the host nation.592 Overall, the cases provided little evidence to support this argument and plenty of evidence to undermine it.

Does U.S. SA undermine host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA does not undermine democratization as it is currently designed and resourced, but it could have an anti-democratic influence under the same design with excessive funding. Does U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians’ security apparatuses undermine democratization? The case of Pakistan revealed two increases in democracy shortly after large spikes in U.S. SA given to military dictators, and both of those SA packages lacked democratic conditionality.593 If this mechanism is generalizable, then the activation threshold is above 0.85% of host nation GDP.594 Pakistan’s positive public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms in the 2000s undermined the argument that a bad U.S. democratic example deters host nation democratization.595 Both cases undermined the argument that Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Both gave ample evidence of domestic and regional factors that can explain different forms of host nation democracy. I found no evidence that either country feared a Western-sponsored democratic revolution.

The most compelling causal mechanism was that U.S. SA (especially when it lacks democratic conditionality) creates an aid dependency dynamic. If U.S. SA reinforces a rentier class in the host nation society, then it likely undermined democracy. Before 2008, U.S. SA to Pakistan was below 6.14% and was followed by democratization. 596 After the 2008 increase in democracy, Pakistan’s Freedom House rating stayed at 4.5 through 2017; and from 2010–2014, U.S. SA averaged 7.37% of Pakistan’s government revenue. 597 This causal mechanism may activate when U.S. SA is above 6.14% of host nation government revenue, but that assumes that Pakistan has a notable rentier dynamic. If Pakistan does have a rentier dynamic, then U.S. SA was a notable contributor to it. I found that Pakistan’s military economy predated U.S. SA, and so U.S. SA may have entrenched it slightly, but it did not alter the fundamental dynamic of state governance. In short, U.S. SA and other aid sources were insufficient to create a rentier dynamic that did not already exist.

I argue that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional actors. It is designed to accomplish U.S. security objectives. The programs capable of driving institutional reform are a meager share of overall U.S. SA. U.S. SA is rarely integrated with a whole-of-government effort for supporting host nation democratization, and when one could argue it is, the quantity and duration of funding is inadequate to supersede the influence of domestic and regional actors. When the host nation’s security interests diverge from those of the United States (e.g., post-9/11 Pakistan), the resulting agency loss increases the threshold of U.S. SA necessary to have a significant influence. Despite the stated theme of democracy promotion in U.S. policy documents, U.S. SA was primarily designed to accomplish security objectives. By design it was not able to compete with domestic and regional actors, and by quantity it is not enough to significantly influence host nation democratization.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The United States can pursue its security objectives and democratization agenda somewhat independently in accordance with its typical design and resourcing of U.S. SA. There is a continual debate in U.S. foreign policy circles regarding whether or not to use aid conditionality to incentivize democratization or to allow U.S. SA to focus solely on security objectives without constraints relating to host nation governance.598 I found no evidence that democracy-related aid conditionality on “traditional” forms of U.S. SA influenced host nation democratization, which means that such conditionality should be applied for other purposes (e.g., to satisfy U.S. legal requirement or political sensitivities).

If the United States wants to decisively support host nation democratization, then U.S. SA should go to recipients with good democratic prospects in sufficient quantity for adequate duration. U.S. SA would need to be designed as part of a whole-of-government support package and implemented for a generation or more. It would need to exceed 1.52% of host nation GDP and increasingly emphasize defense institution building programs and other programs that bolster host nation civil-military relations. 599 Anything less is unlikely to support host nation democratization decisively. How would a head of state decide where to commit its resources to promote democracy if it cannot afford to take this approach worldwide? I concur with Ottaway that there are two basic choices. The United States can lower its democracy promotion policy ambitions and settle for sub-standard democracies, or it can abandon some countries in which democratic prospects are particularly dim and focus its resources on countries that are more likely to democratize.600 U.S. SA would go to states that largely share U.S. security interests (which reduces agency loss); have a high GDP, a history of democracy, and some form of civil society (which supports democratic consolidation); have neighboring democratic examples; have host nation elites willing to democratize; and have the institutional capacity to absorb the assistance.

#### DoS crowds themselves out anyway

Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, <https://afsa.org/creeping-foreign-policy-militarization-or-creeping-state-department-irrelevance> /GoGreen!

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.

Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?

Has Foggy Bottom lost relevance in the foreign affairs arena by emphasizing soft-power social agendas (e.g., the creation of special envoys for various religions, LGBTQ, the Holocaust, global youth and global women’s affairs) that are distinctly American over hard-power national security interests (e.g., strong international security and healthy economic systems that protect allies and provide opportunities for American businesses)? Or is it, perhaps, simply that the Foreign Service is either late in arriving or missing from the field where the military is operating?

The answer, of course, is all of the above. But there are two broad aspects of the problem that I believe are fundamental: first, the proliferation of priorities at the State Department following the end of the Cold War; and second, the missed opportunities at State during the past 20 years of joint operations with the military to institutionalize the kind of professional and personal relationships that would enable the smaller Foreign Service to exert leadership in the foreign policy arena at home and abroad.

A Proliferation of Priorities

The end of the Cold War and the so-called “end of history” marked a shift for the State Department. We hired a more diverse Foreign Service that, in turn, took on a broader range of narrower activities that more resemble small-picture social engineering than traditional, big-picture diplomacy. At the same time, State reallocated existing resources to create an alphabet soup of new under secretaries, functional bureaus, offices and special envoys. At its peak during the Obama administration, there were more than 50 of the latter. As Ambassador Jim Jeffrey observes in a March 3 piece in Foreign Policy, neither the 2010 nor the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review focuses on “traditional” diplomacy. The department has diffused its energy too broadly to the neglect of fundamentals, and this, in turn, left a vacuum that the military has had to fill.

New State Department priorities include such things as this, for example. In Muslim-majority Indonesia in 2014 and 2015, not long before the deadly January 2016 extremist terrorist attack on Starbucks and other locations rocked the capital, Jakarta, our consulate in Surabaya produced impressive Hispanic heritage month YouTube videos of its celebrations, which included spending money to bring Los Angeles artists to paint murals on the walls of a local school and sponsor fun runs for local girls. Similarly, in March the U.S. embassy in Macedonia—a country with simmering interethnic tensions and endemic corruption that hasn’t had a government since elections in early December 2016—flew in a lawyer from the Office of the Special Counsel to lecture locals on the Hatch Act, even as refugees streamed north from Greece and European-born Islamic State group fighters returned from Syrian battlefields.

A solely military response is not sufficient. We want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S. government and the international community, recognizing that it is only through a combination of capabilities that we will achieve and sustain our strongest deterrence posture.

—General Joseph Votel,

Commander, U.S. Central Command,

March 9, 2017

In religiously conservative Uganda, a U.S. Army commander there to train units in combating the Lord’s Resistance Army and al-Shabaab in Somalia had to deal with backlash from an angry counterpart when the U.S. embassy flew the rainbow flag high over Kampala in a righteous response to that country’s persecution of the LGBTQ community. That subsequently set back efforts to combat other forms of violent abuses of human rights in eastern Africa.

One general commented, “If everything is a priority for the State Department, nothing is.”

On its own, each example represents admirable commitment by the Foreign Service to human rights, social progress and good governance policy efforts. But collectively, that commitment ignores the opportunity cost of not prioritizing activities more immediate to countering violent extremism, promoting economic prosperity and strengthening the security necessary to address higher-order human rights and civic goals.

The proliferation of activities that pander to U.S. domestic special interests and divert resources from other work, and whose effectiveness cannot easily be measured, is one aspect of the creeping irrelevance of American diplomacy. This problem has been compounded by the Foreign Service’s apparent unwillingness or inability to work with the U.S. military when they need us the most.

### AT: NB – AT: Mission Creep Link

#### No mission creep link – DoD self-restrains – AND fiat solves anyway

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

Counterterrorism can certainly explain U.S. intervention in Mali; however, enabling French success explains the timeline. More importantly, the case of U.S.-supported French intervention in Mali is illustrative of the role the United States plays in supporting developed countries. France is the latest developed country to need U.S. assistance, but requests like this are common. This is true for almost every one of the 50 countries serving in Afghanistan today, as it was true with European countries in the Balkans, Australian forces in East Timor, and British forces in West Africa. These examples highlight that the foreign policy goals of many developed countries exceed their military capacity, which requires them to rely on the U.S. military for assistance. As developed countries’ defense budgets fall further, reliance on the United States is going to increase. This remains a decades-old frustration. Most recently, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense, while living up to our responsibilities."7

Pragmatically, the United States would like its partners to do more, but shared challenges and limited budgets will reinforce the value of American logistics, combat experience, and intelligence capacity. Further, American support of other countries reinforces the treaty arrangements with 27 NATO countries and five Asian countries. Twenty years ago, there seemed to be little relevance to these treaties and security arrangements, let alone a rationale for invoking them or expanding them. Yet, the opposite occurred. NATO increased its membership three times from 16 to 19 in 1999, again to 26 in 2006, and again to 28 in 2009. At the same time the number of NATO members increased, NATO changed from its traditional mission of territorial defense to one of global security engagement. With each expansion, new members require training and equipping to NATO standards. With each new operation, NATO countries require access to U.S. intelligence, critical technology, and global logistics.

In addition to formal treaties of alliance, an additional dozen countries are offered protection under the U.S. security umbrella either by law, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or by policy such as United States’ support for Israel.8 These protections include provisions to train and equip their militaries. Another dozen countries are offered special security provisions through Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. MNNA does not confer a mutual defense relationship, but the largely symbolic act implies a close working relationship with another country's defense forces.9 It is more akin to a preferred buyer’s program allowing countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea access to advanced weapons systems. With weapons purchases also come long-term training and maintenance contracts. From a U.S. perspective, it has a comparative advantage in defense exports; strategically, programs like these are intended to overcome the free-rider problem the United States faces with its partners.10 For every Joint Strike Fighter Japan buys, the United States can deploy one less to northeast Asia.

Given the diplomatic nature of these security partnerships, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs focuses these activities, regulates the defense trade and arms transfers to reinforce the military capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners, and ensures that the transfer of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interests. Further, the Bureau promotes regional security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue, as well as through the provision of security assistance to friendly countries and international peacekeeping efforts. The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations (e.g., South Korea), and preventing crisis and conflict (e.g., facilitating Colombia’s success against the decades-old FARC insurgency). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and the Camp David Accords.11 Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that it seeks to strengthen it and not undermine it.12

One reason the United States concentrates assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international special operations exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute, attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Given the significant U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s military and police training infrastructure, it is likely that Afghanistan could eventually host regional training if the insurgency subsides to acceptable levels. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. We see the benefits of this today where U.S.-trained Colombian pilots are training Mexican pilots in Colombia.

**[Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. International Assistance (Account 150) OMITTED]**

In addition to the Department of State budget for security assistance, the Defense Department directly funds security assistance through section 1206/7 and other command funds such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This authority did provoke more concern about militarizing foreign policy; however, this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Further, U.S. ambassadors must approve all programs. Thus, the Department of State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels through the embassy country team.

CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

With national security focused on weak states and persistent security concerns among stable allies like South Korea, the U.S. military has been changing over the last 20 years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy. In some sense, this turns the idea of militarization of foreign policy on its head; the Pentagon is being demilitarized and valued for its ability to impart military capabilities to U.S. partners.

Given the current structure of the international system and technological advances, the United States does not need partners in the same way as it did in the past where they provided direct benefits through coaling stations, maintenance facilities, or large bases. While the number of forward bases is still substantial, the number of forward deployed forces are greatly reduced. More importantly, the nature of the presence has changed; the United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g., assistance to Colombia’s military) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g., future basing in Australia). It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to support the global demand for peacekeepers.14 The United States certainly gets increased access to countries around the world through these programs, but given the overwhelming military dominance of the United States, it does not abuse these relationships or ignore seemingly insignificant states. Instead, it seeks to create partners where sovereignty is respected and all parties derive benefits. The latest example of this is U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as dictated by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

### AT: NB – AT: Turf Wars Link

#### No turf wars link – AND no impact to minor tensions

Reveron 7 Derek S. Reveron, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, PhD public policy analysis, MA political science, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8-30-2007, <http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07_proceeding_210193.pdf> /GoGreen!

Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, a combatant commander works extremely closely with his Political Advisor (POLAD) and the country teams where his engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, there are tensions with strategic impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”73 However, both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders understand they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans. 74 Yet an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination, but also interagency and combined planning.

#### BUT, even if there are, CP alone does NOT solve them – the logic of their “slippery slope” link means DoD will keep pushing regardless – AND DoS can’t and won’t try to stop them, even with more authority

House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/proposal-of-an-unconventional-warfare-strategy-to-dominate-the-human-domain> /GoGreen!

Some broader changes necessary to support long-term strategic operations are more elusive to accomplish. Most government agencies and military leadership will resist working under to the State Department’s direction. U.S. leadership must engineer a transformation of the traditions of tension into a tradition of cooperation and respectful understanding of each element’s role in accomplishing the mission. Establishing a regular rotation of joint assignments among government agency and military personnel could support interagency understanding and repair relationships for the conduct of joint operations.[xvii] The State Department must also accept its role as the institution responsible for achieving all U.S. foreign policy objectives and the task of leadership within the government inherent in this responsibility. All of the other departments must embrace their critical role in supporting U.S. foreign policy with direction and expertise in political warfare provided by the OUW.

### AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

#### DoD’s more likely to solve NATO backsliding

McCarthy 19 Deborah A. McCarthy, Visiting Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “The Militarization of US Foreign Policy,” FIIA Comment 13, November 2019, <https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/comment13_militarization-of-us-foreign-policy.pdf> /GoGreen!

Much has been written on the “militarization” of US foreign policy. Since 9/11, the Department of Defense expanded its non-combat activities into areas normally reserved for traditional diplomacy. In 2005, it was given a mandate to build “indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society”. While the initial focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, it allowed the Department to do the same in other regions.

In 2009, the Department’s international mandate broadened to “strengthening governance and the rule of law and fostering economic stability and development”. Congress added new authorities, most recently allowing the US military to work with non-military security forces. The Defense Department now manages a greater portion of security assistance than the Department of State. The Trump Administration continues to favor the use of the US military over US diplomacy to address great-power competition. It has increased the defense budget while slashing that for diplomacy; for 2020, it requested a 4.9% increase for the Defense Department and proposed a 21% cut for the State Department. Today, the Department of Defense plays an important role in US foreign policy.

This expanded role is visible in Europe. Despite tirades by President Donald Trump on the value of NATO, and finger-pointing on member contributions, US military engagement with NATO and in Europe continues, with broad Congressional and public support. Through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), the US military has increased its forward presence and exercises with allies and partners. Through Operation Atlantic Resolve, the US European Command added US troop rotations across Eastern Europe and prepositioned equipment. The Defense Department also boosted training and assistance for Georgia and Ukraine. The increased US military presence in Europe was triggered by Russia’s invasion of Crimea and aimed at reassuring allies along Europe’s eastern frontier. Today, it is part of a broader US and NATO deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.

The Defense Department has become involved in institution-building in the region, normally the purview of diplomacy. Examples include repairing schools, conducting anti-corruption workshops, and law enforcement training. The gray zone challenges in Europe, especially cyber and disinformation, are being addressed primarily by the Defense Department. Whereas the State Department eliminated the office of the Cyber Coordinator, the Defense Department broadened its networks and now includes civilian authorities in exercises. Whereas the State Department has very little funding to fight Russian disinformation, the Defense Department is expanding initiatives within EUCOM and with NATO.

The consequences of the increased militarization of US foreign policy for transatlantic relations are threefold.

First, US engagement in Europe appears more militarized. The addition of US forces and the increased tempo of exercises has meant that tens of thousands of US troops have moved across Europe visible to all civilians. A publicity campaign has been waged to highlight this commitment. New security agreements are being signed and celebrated, including the new letter on security cooperation between the US, Finland and Sweden. The increased US pressure on burden sharing, although not always well received, has meant even more defense discussions.

In contrast, US diplomatic engagement has decreased. President Trump’s negative rhetoric about Europe, the decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA), and friction on issues such as Nord Stream II have disrupted normal diplomatic discourse. There have been no US-EU Summits since President Trump took office and subgroups on energy and cyber have not met in several years.

Secondly, joint efforts to address threats to democracy in the region will likely be carried out or funded by the Defense Department. The State Department simply does not have the resources: for 2018, its budget for all of Europe and Eurasia was $1.2 billion. The budget for EDI alone was $4.5 billion.

Thirdly, beyond Europe, US-European cooperation is more likely to advance in military rather than in policy channels. On China, for example, where policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are unable to agree on a comprehensive approach, defense officials are working together to address China’s new military muscle in forums such as the US France Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue. In Africa, where US and EU policymakers have vastly different strategies, military cooperation continues to fight terrorism, crime and human trafficking.

The enhanced position of the Defense Department in US foreign policy is likely to continue. The US military has not sought this role. Indeed, US military leaders have repeatedly called for restoring balance between the use of military and diplomatic tools and for funding the State Department. Despite these appeals, the Trump Administration’s preference for using the US military will further increase the militarization of US foreign policy.

For Europe, leveraging defense ties can help balance diplomatic disconnects across the transatlantic. While there are challenges in defense policy, defense relations may prove to be the steadier foundation for transatlantic cooperation in the near future.

#### DoS’s heavy-handed conditionality backfires

Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/> /GoGreen! \*added [freezing]

The Price of Unity

Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing [freezing] the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.”

Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”

Second, NATO’s response should be as collective and resolute as possible. If pressure is applied by only a few NATO countries, the ally in question may not take the warning seriously and could use the divisions among allies to avoid accountability. If enough allies agree to lean on a problematic NATO country, then accepting short-term disunity for the sake of preserving trans-Atlantic values could be worth it. In 2019, Turkey ultimately decided to lift its longstanding veto to the defense plans of Poland and the Baltic states because it was facing a growing and consistent pressure from numerous allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The unity of the members of the Quad was critical in that case and changed Ankara’s strategic calculus.

Last but not least, all allies must be subject to the same objective criteria and scrutiny. Otherwise, the backsliding ally will simply claim it is being singled out and dismiss the charges. The International Secretariat can be helpful here by conducting an impartial, evenhanded assessment. Strong involvement of NATO’s secretary general will also be key in preserving political cohesion through this thorny process. Recently, Secretary General Stoltenberg played an instrumental role in easing the tensions between Greece and Turkey through the establishment of a bilateral de-confliction mechanism in which he did not assess blame but merely facilitated dialogue to be informed by international rules and norms.

#### Democracy does NOT save NATO

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/democracy-summit-china-russia/2021/12/03/d64d4544-537a-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html> /GoGreen!

There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.

China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.

Biden isn’t the first and won’t be the last American president to make democracy promotion central to his foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world “safe for democracy”; Franklin Roosevelt promulgated the Atlantic Charter. The Clinton administration was present at the creation of the Community of Democracies. George W. Bush had his Freedom Agenda and talked about ridding the world of dictators. All found democracy promotion a useful tool to advance U.S. values and interests.

Biden seems to genuinely believe that democrats and dictators are in a do-or-die battle over who will own the 21st century. Though he insists that he doesn’t want a new cold war, some of his overcharged rhetoric belies this view. In March, Biden announced his intention “to invite an alliance of democracies to come here to discuss the future,” including holding “China accountable to follow the rules” on issues such as persecution of its Uyghur citizens and its territorial disputes with Taiwan. Biden has said of China’s President Xi Jinping that he “doesn’t have a democratic bone . . . in his body” and that Xi believes “democracy cannot keep up with” China.

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

But the Russians don’t have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don’t need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin’s overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia?

Likewise, Xi’s main priority is maintaining his control and the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power. He is all too happy to claim that the Chinese government is outperforming America’s dysfunctional system. But it is simply not the case that he thinks these goals require Beijing to actively spread authoritarianism with Chinese characteristics abroad. And China’s wealth and power, not to mention its social stability, depend on competing effectively within the interdependent global economic system, not toppling it.

Another flaw in the Biden administration’s approach is the presumption that all democracies think alike based on their shared commitment to democratic values. If only it were that simple. Values do shape a nation’s foreign policy, but history, geography, culture, political ideology and material interests also matter. It is precisely for these reasons that America’s democratic allies and partners do not see eye to eye on how to deal with China or Russia — and why they shouldn’t be forced to choose sides between the United States and the authoritarians.

#### US backsliding thumps

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There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.

It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.

#### The US is irrelevant – other members and the EU either thump OR solve

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Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

### AT: NB – AT: Global Demo I/L

#### No modelling

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### AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – DPT

#### No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

In my view, it is difficult—if not impossible—to support the democratic peace hypothesis without any reservations. The key caveats should not be ignored and certainly deserve more attention before we can confidently argue that democracies are more peaceful than other types of political systems. Please notice that I can already reveal that the assumed link between democracy and intrastate war is problematic as well, but this topic will be at the core of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

Selection of Articles: Democracy and War

The instrumental value of democracy cannot convincingly be found in democracy’s expected bond with peace. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of an analysis of statistical studies, which will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. So how did I select the articles for my database?4

For this chapter and Chapter 4, I selected the articles that focused on war and democracy. Using the online database Web of Science (formerly known as Web of Knowledge), I identified a total of almost 8000 articles published in the sampled journals until the end of 2015. I identifed them by entering ‘democr\*’ in the basic search field; this asterisk (\*)-based ‘wildcard’ allows searching for terms including ‘democratic’, ‘democracy’, and ‘democratization’ (in both British and American spellings) simultaneously, in the title, abstract and/or the keywords. As a next step, I excluded articles in which ‘democracy’ is used as synonym for state (e.g. analysis of the relationship between immigration policies and unemployment in European democracies) or a specific political party or movement (e.g. the ‘Democrats’ in the USA, or Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army) or a specifc country (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo). In addition, I identified them by entering ‘war\*’ in the basic search feld. The words democracy (democr\*) and war (war\*) need to be mentioned in title and/or abstract—and I also checked for equivalents of ‘war’ like ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ and ‘no peace’.5

As it is not feasible to analyse thousands of articles, it is necessary to take a next step in the selection process. I decided to select these articles, which will be part of the database for the third and fourth chapter, in three different ways. The first method is to choose the articles with the most citations. So, for example, in Chapter 3, the articles which are cited more than a hundred times are included in this first list. The article by Beck et al. (1998) has been cited more than 951 times, and as a consequence, this article is part of the database. But also articles with a much lower number of citations (such as Barbieri 1996, with 179 citations) are included in my analyses.

The second method is simply to include the most recent articles published in the past five years, so since beginning 2011 until end 2015. The most recent articles can easily be overlooked by applying the first method of most quoted articles. In my view, however, they still need to be included as they present the most recent findings and engage with the recent and innovative debates, which cannot be ignored in this book. For example, recent studies on democracy and interstate war (Chapter 3) have paid more attention to the mechanisms (see, e.g., Zeigler et al. 2014), and there is a growing attention for the impact of political institutions in recent studies on democracy and intrastate war (Chapter 4; see, e.g., Walter 2015). Those recent findings cannot be ignored in any systematic analysis of statistical studies on this theme.

The third method is the most subjective approach of selecting articles, as it is based on the ‘snowballing method’. So it includes articles which have not been selected by the first and second methods, but which have been quoted extensively and regularly by the previously selected articles. For example, the article by Bethany Lacina (2006) cannot be selected based on having high citations (the first method) and it cannot be included based on being a recent publication (the second method), but it has been mentioned by key studies and hence surfaces via the snowballing method (a third method). This article is important as it clearly distinguishes the determinants of conflict severity from those for conflict onset, and those determinants seem to be quite different, which is crucial information for Chapter 4.

In this way, my study presents and assesses the findings based on a big pool of statistical studies in the published literature. Based on this assessment, I will be able to draw clearer conclusions concerning the significance of the effects of democracy on interstate war (this chapter) and intrastate war (the next chapter). The Appendix shows more detailed information of the selected articles.

The Democratic Peace Hypothesis, Its Roots and Supporters

The democratic peace hypothesis6 states that democracies never or seldom go to war with one another. Where is this powerful idea of ‘democratic peace’ coming from? Before discussing the main findings of the statistical articles and before describing the four caveats of the ‘democratic peace paradigm’, we need to know a bit more around the background and the roots of this idea.

Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual Peace has often been mentioned as the foundation for this hypothesis. Kant believed peace was difficult to achieve, since ‘the natural state is one of war’ (Kant 1795: 10). A state of peace must therefore be established for—in his view—it is certain that hostilities will be committed and people need to be protected from each other. In such a world, each may treat his neighbour, from whom he demands security, as an enemy. In a dictatorship where ‘the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it’ (Kant 1795: 13).

In contrast, the situation is different in constitutional republics, according to Kant. He argued that the majority of the people in republics would never vote to go to war, except for pure self-defence. Therefore, a world with only republics would be peaceful, since there would be no aggressors. The republican constitution, which requires the consent of the citizens to start a war, gives the positive prospect of perpetual peace.

It is important to note that the ideas of Kant on the one hand and the modern democratic peace scholars on the other hand are not completely similar. For example, Kant talked about republics instead of democratic states as the ideal states to achieve peace. He defined republican states as states with representative governments, in which the legislature is separated from the executive. Not surprisingly—considering the epoch in which he lived—Kant did not include universal suffrage in his definition, which is now seen as an essential dimension of democracy, even of the most minimalist types of democracy (Dahl 1971; see also Chapter 2). Moreover, Kant argued that republics will be at peace in general, which means that such political systems are expected to be not only in peace with each other, but also with other non-republican systems. Nowadays, only few scholars would support this approach of a ‘monadic democratic peace’. As will become clear at the end of this chapter, there is not much evidence for the idea that democracies are more peaceful in general.

Since the 1960s, most statistical studies have not focused on the ‘monadic democratic peace hypothesis’ but on testing the ‘dyadic democratic peace hypothesis’. This dyadic hypothesis states that it is less likely that democracies fight with each other, compared to other ‘dyads’ or other pairs of different types of political systems. The sociologist Dean Babst was the first scholar who started to build on Kant’s old idea in the ‘dyadic’ way, and decided to test it in statistical studies (Babst 1964, 1972). He concluded that ‘no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941’ (Babst 1972: 55). His study was not published in one of the journals in the field of international relations, but in a sociological journal and later in Industrial Research. Therefore, it was not read by international relations scholars, and initially, it did not get the attention it deserved in the field of international politics.

Babst’s work was, for example, not cited by Melvin Small and J. David Singer (1976), and their fndings seemed to contradict Babst’s study. However, Small and Singer did not compare the rates of war proneness for democracies and dictatorships, but instead they focused on the question whether wars involving democratic states have historically been significantly different in length or in degree of violence compared to wars involving only dictatorships. For length and degree of violence during the wars, they did not find a difference between democracies and dictatorships, so they concluded that types of political systems did not matter.7 A few years later, Rudolph J. Rummel did cite Babst’s work and replicated Babst’s idea in statistical tests, which were described in the fourth book of his five-volume Understanding Confict and War (1975– 1981). He found clear support for his eleventh (of the 33) propositions about causes and conditions of conflict, which stated that ‘Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence’ (Rummel 1979: 279).

Eventually, those innovative studies from the 1970s helped to evoke the interest in the democratic peace proposition, and in the expected peaceful nature of relationships among democratic states. Since the 1980s, the number of quantitative studies has increased considerably, accumulating into an impressive field of research in international relations with its own ‘empirical law’ of democratic peace (Levy 1989: 270; see also Ray 1998).

This democratic peace hypothesis has not only received support from political scientists, but also from politicians and policy makers. Particularly since 1993, the idea of a democratic peace has inspired American foreign policies aimed at the promotion of peace and democracy. As the 42nd president of the USA (1993–2001), Bill Clinton was the first politician who explicitly bridged the gap between these findings in international relations on the one hand, and his foreign policy strategy on the other hand, at least rhetorically. Anthony Lake, who was Clinton’s National Security Adviser, stated in 1993 that in order to cope with America’s foreign policy challenges, the expansion of democratic states around the world would be essential because ‘it protects our [U.S.] interests and security’ (see Henderson 2002: 20). In his 1994 State of the Union, Clinton declared that ‘Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other’.8 Findings from research in the field of international relations seemed to have a direct impact on policy making, and this move of the Clinton administration can be seen as ‘a textbook case of arbitrage between the ivory tower and the real world’ (Gowa 1999: 109).

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, went one big step further in his faith that democratic peace holds. He argued that efforts to turn Iraq into a democratic country would have positive effects on Iraqi’s neighbours. The authoritarian regimes in the region would fall as domino stones and follow the Iraqi example. They would start democratizing as soon as they could, which would then result in achieving a peaceful and stable the Middle East. The real motives for attacking Iraq may have been different, but ‘regime change’ was at the heart of Washington’s rhetoric when the USA started to bomb Baghdad in March 2003. The rhetoric of the Bush administration focused on toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, and replacing the entire underlying dictatorial system with a democracy.

Moreover, George W. Bush used the democratic peace idea to justify the war in Iraq, declaring, ‘The reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy’.9 In 2004, the 43rd President of the USA said: ‘If you think you can have peace without democracy – again - I think you’ll find that - I can only speak for myself, that I will be extremely doubtful that it will ever happen’.10 In his second inaugural address, he stated that ‘the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world’.

Again, these are just words from speeches and can hence be seen as rhetoric to defend military intervention (cf. Jervis 2003; Kaufmann 2004; Daalder and Lindsay 2005; Owen 2005; Lieberfeld 2005; Schmidt and Williams 2008). Still, in the end, politicians have rationalized their political decisions based on one of the most powerful ideas taken from studies in the field of international relations, clearly showing the influence of this academic idea in political practice.

Hence, the field of international relations seems to have its own law: democracies rarely fight with each other. It cannot be denied that the evidence supporting the democratic peace proposition is quite diverse in character (see Ray 1998): the evidence has been epistemological (Rummel 1975), philosophical (Doyle 1986), formal (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), historical (Weart 1994; Ray 1995; Owen 1994), experimental (Mintz and Geva 1993), anthropological (Ember et al. 1992; Crawford 1994), psychological (Kegley and Hermann 1995), economic (Brawley 1993; Weede 1996) and political (Gaubatz 1991). Still, there have been numerous critical studies (see, i.e., Hayes 2011), and the general picture is unclear. We do not yet know much about the overall findings from statistical studies.

So far, it seems as if some quantitative studies—mainly within the field of international relations—have found strong and robust evidence which supports the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’. Those studies show that democracy has had a positive influence on international peace (see, i.e., Rummel 1979; Ray and Russett 1996). In this sense, the idea of a democratic peace seems to be confirmed. Political scientists such as James Lee Ray are passionate supporters: ‘No scientific evidence is entirely definitive’ but ‘based on all the empirical evidence so far’ the more defensible of the two possible definitive answers to the question “Does democracy cause peace?” is “Yes” (Ray 1998: 43). However, based on my own analyses of the empirical studies with statistical evidence, I cannot be as enthusiastic as those scholars; to the contrary, I whole-heartily disagree with them, as a more systematic analysis of the articles shows that there are four important weaknesses, which seriously undermines the idea that peace is one of democracy’s instrumental values.

Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy

While analysing the selected articles, the first remarkable finding is that only a relatively small number of studies have actually tested the democratic peace hypothesis. Most of the studies have focused on the mechanisms (see next section, caveat 2), and hence seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war. In this way, the majority of the studies—often unintentionally—reinforce the idea that democratic peace actually exists without testing this proposition. However, none of the studies that directly test the democratic peace hypothesis found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war. All democratic peace studies have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace, such as economic development and growth, geographic distance and contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization and political stability. The findings show that it is not just democracy which explains war, not at all. Within this group of studies, which explicitly test the democratic peace hypothesis, four different types of findings can be detected. I will discuss those results more in-depth in the rest of this section.

First Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Significant Too

The first subgroup consists of scholars who stress the importance of democratic peace, despite the fact their own analyses have shown that other factors are statistically significant as well (Maoz and Russett 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Beck et al. 1998; Ray 2013). For example, some studies (e.g. Rousseau et al. 1996) included alternative independent variables in order to test realist arguments. They tested whether the distribution of power determines decisions to use force, and measures each state’s military capabilities relative to its opponent. A state’s military capability is the average of three elements: number of troops, military expenditures and military expenditures per soldier. They found that this realist variable was strong, positive and statistically significant at the 0.001 level in their analyses (see, e.g., Rousseau et al. 1996: 522, Table 2). However, not only a state’s military capabilities appeared to be an important explanation for peace. In addition, wealth, growth, alliances and contiguity played a crucial role when explaining interstate war (see, e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993: 632, Table 1).11 Moreover, when other factors are included, the impact of democracy on the likelihood of international crises is even spurious (Maoz and Russett 1993: 632; Henderson 2002: 141, see also p. 3).12 Still, scholars in this group keep defending the democratic peace idea, despite the fact that their own analyses showed the significance of alternative explanations.

Second Result: Initially There Is Correlation, but the Impact of Democracy Is Spurious When Other Explanatory Factors Are Included in the Models

The second subgroup of scholars is far more radical. Based on their own analyses, this group concludes that the democratic peace link is a spurious one (Weede 1984, 1996; Barbieri 1996; Mousseau 2013; Gartzke and Weisiger 2014).13 Typically, efforts to demonstrate the spuriousness of the statistical democratic peace pointed to other factors that, when accounted for ‘properly’, eliminated or dramatically reduced the statistical significance of shared democracy. Hence, the studies in this second group did not find strong evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis anymore, once other explanatory factors were included in the models.14

One of the most convincing alternative explanations of peace between countries is that there is no democratic peace, but a capitalist peace instead. The settlement in Germany and Japan succeeded because of the establishment of capitalist peace. Because of economic support by the Americans, who encouraged free trade and offered trade opportunities in practice as well, the poorer economies in Europe and Japan would gain economically, resulting in ‘economic growth, prosperity, and, ultimately, free trade among most of the more technologically advanced economies’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 232). By establishing and expanding free trade, the incentives for war would quickly decrease among trading states, according to this approach. To prevent new interstate wars after World War II, the capitalist peace was a far more important factor than the American promotion of democracy and its political institutions.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, also states that economic development accounts for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. Economic development is a key factor to explain democracy (Lipset 1959; see also Hegre 2003; Weede 2004).15 Moreover, economic development also plays a role when explaining peace, and the presence of market-oriented economies in countries have a positive impact on both democracy in those countries and peace between them (Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013; see also Hegre 2014). Democratic peace only exists when both democracies have high levels of economic development, when economic development is well above the global median.

In fact, the poorest 21% of the democracies studied, and the poorest 4–5% of current democracies, are significantly more likely than other kinds of political systems to fight each other (see, e.g., Mousseau 2005). Moreover, if at least one of the democracies involved has a very low level of economic development, then democracy cannot prevent war.16 Still, there is a pacifying effect of free trade and economic interdependence, which is more important than the effect of democracy, because the former affects peace both directly and indirectly, by producing economic development and ultimately, democracy (see Weede 2004).17

Capitalist peace is not the only alternative explanation. Shared interests in general, and political similarities in specific, can also be seen as an important second alternative explanation for war and peace between countries (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; Gartzke 2007; Gowa 1999; Henderson 2002). Democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar. So the difference of the scores of both countries also contributes to the conflict proneness of the dyad. If the difference in levels of democracy is big, then the chance of conflict is higher (cf. Oneal and Russett 1997: 281–282).

Many researchers have conflated both the conflict-dampening impact of joined democracy and the confict-exacerbating impact of political distance in the variables focusing on political systems, but as Errol A. Henderson (2002: 32) convincingly argued: ‘Fusing these two contrasting attributes in a single variable makes it difficult to distinguish between the competing processes’. Therefore, it is better to include an additional variable of ‘political dissimilarity’ in the model. Henderson (2002) was one of the first scholars who included this variable and measured it by taking the absolute value of the difference between the two states’ scores. His main variables were not only political similarity, but also geographic distance and economic interdependence, and he concluded that democratic peace is a statistical artefact which disappears when those other variables are taken into account. Political similarity clearly has a pacifying effect18 (see Werner 2000; Henderson 2002; Beck et al. 2004), and it is not democracy per se which is the decisive factor.19

Hence, the benefits of trade and trade interdependence are essential explanations, while democracy is spurious or at least subordinate (see also Rosecrance 1986; Weede 1984, 1996; Hegre 2000, 2014; Jervis 2002; Souva 2003; Rasler and Thompson 2005: 235; Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005). Based on those studies, it is safe to conclude that democracy, on its own, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace.

Third Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Much Stronger

This same point that democracy is just one of the explanations for peace (and not even a very important one) is also at the core of studies in the third subgroup. Scholars of this group keep arguing that there is support for the democratic peace hypothesis, and that the link is not spurious. In this sense, they are less radical than the second group of scholars, as they do not completely reject the value of democracy for peace. On the other hand, their own analyses have clearly shown that alternative factors—hence other factors than democracy or type of political system— are not only statistically significant but also more important when trying to explain interstate war (Bremer 1992; Gelpi 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Reiter and Stam 2002; Peterson 2013; Caselli et al. 2015).

Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that democracy is not the most important factor, while war is more likely to occur between states that are geographically proximate, approximately equal in power, major powers, allied, economically advanced and highly militarized than between those that are not. Bivariate analyses of these factors in relation to the onset of interstate war over all pairs of states in the period from 1816 to 1965 have generally supported these associations. However, multivariate analyses revealed some differences. Stuart Bremer (1992), for example, showed that some factors are far more important than others. The existence of a dangerous, war-prone dyad can be best explained by the presence of contiguity, the absence of an alliance and the absence of more advanced economy. The absence of democratic polity and other factors (absence of overwhelming preponderance, and presence of major power) are less powerful. Overall, these findings suggest that our research priorities may be seriously distorted and that we should not focus too much on the perceived positive impact of democracy, but on other factors (such as alliances and economic factors) instead.

Fourth Result: There Is Correlation, but Only Under Certain Specific Conditions

The final subgroup of scholars argues that we cannot unconditionally accept the idea that democratic peace exists in general, so always and everywhere. Their statistical studies clearly showed that support for this hypothesis heavily depends on other factors. The chance of democratic peace depends not just on the specific historical period (Cold War or not; Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Weede 1984), but also the stage of the conflict (beginning, duration or severity; see Bremer 1993; Bennett and Stam 1996; Reed 2000), and on the neighbourhood instability (extent of confict in the region; see Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; Gibler and Miller 2013). Despite the differences between the studies, there is one common finding in all studies: when explaining interstate war, we cannot just rely on the impact of democracy, as it is too much dependent on other factors.

Several scholars found strong evidence for the idea that democratic peace exists, but only during some specific historical periods. Based on this evidence, they concluded that democratic peace is simply a statistical artefact of the Cold War. For example, Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa (1995) found statistical support for the idea that peace between democracies is an artefact of the Cold War, when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another (see also Mearsheimer 1990). Sebastian Rosato (2003) also argued that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance.

Since the Second World War, war has become a very costly affair. Scholars discovered that only a handful of states are ‘capable of engaging in major power warfare. That process of elimination has not yet extinguished the possibility of major power warfare, but it has lowered its probability immensely’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). The chance to achieve something in a war is low in general, and even lower in a bipolar world with two big power players risking high nuclear war costs (Jervis 2002). While war became more costly, trade became less costly; as a consequence, the war/trade costs increased during the Cold War (Rosecrance 1986; see also Jervis 2002). In such a world, war and conflict have become less attractive, while trade and cooperation have become more appealing (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). Hence, more states decided to adopt trading strategies in order to prevent confict and war as much as possible. In the end, democracy was part of the story, but only a very small part with a subordinated role next to the power dynamics during the Cold War, the costs of warfare and the benefits of trade.

Some scholars found evidence that the democratic peace still exists in the post-Cold War period (Park 2013) which weakens this argument. However, most analyses showed that dyadic dispute rates have converged after the Cold War (see, e.g., Gowa 2011). Moreover, jointly democratic dyads are likely to be allied only after 1945 (see Gibler and Sarkees 2004); during the 1816–1944 time period, there is even a negative relationship between democratic dyads and alliance formation.20 These findings cast serious doubts on the idea of a general existence of democratic peace.

Not only the historical period, but also the *stage* of the conflict is crucial. Some scholars in this group provided evidence that democratic peace is not universal, but that it depends on the stage and whether we focus on the beginning, duration or severity of the conflict. Although joint democracy has some pacifying effects on the onset of conflict, the results suggest that they are unrelated to the escalation of disputes to war (see Reed 2000). Moreover, democratic peace is dependent on the neighbourhood instability. Democracies often have few territorial issues over which to contend, as they tend to be part of a stable region. Democracies only seldom have territorial disputes with their neighbours, and therefore they can more easily choose favourable conflicts to escalate. The type of political system does not predict conflict selection or victory once controls are added for issue salience (Gibler and Miller 2013; see also Park and James 2015). There is an interaction between joint democracy and regional instability, which confirms the idea that the effects of type of political system on continued conflict apply mostly to dyads in peaceful regions (Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; see also Park and James 2015). Very democratic countries might even become more aggressive and faster than other political systems, once the region becomes more hostile (see, e.g., Baliga et al. 2011).

The General Lesson from the Results in a Nutshell (Caveat 1)

In short, regardless of the differences between the statistical studies on democratic peace, all findings have indicated that other explanations are important as well. It is clear that democracy is just one of the explanations, and certainly not the most important one,21 sometimes even spurious and often heavily dependent on other factors. It is not (just) democracy to be preoccupied with, when trying to prevent war between countries (Table 3.1).

Caveat 2: What Are the Causal Mechanisms?

Most of the statistical studies on democratic peace seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war; based on this assumption, they then decide to focus on the mechanisms. This is problematic as none of the democratic peace studies found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war (see the previous section). As a consequence, the next step of looking for mechanisms is quite irrelevant and not necessary in my view, but most studies nevertheless argue that the field lacks strong theoretical foundations and robust empirical evidence that can reveal convincing causal mechanisms.22 Those studies seem to accept the correlation between dyadic democracy and peace, and then start questioning whether democracy really causes peace before investigating potential mechanisms.

Table 3.1 Statistical studies on democracy and interstate war (dyadic level)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy | Studies |
| ‘It’s just democracy; democracy is most important explanation for peace between countries’ | No studies found |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are significant too’ | Beck et al. (1998), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Maoz and Russett (1993), Ray (2013), and Rousseau et al. (1996) |
| ‘Initially there is correlation, but the impact of democracy is spurious when other explanatory factors are included in the models’ | Barbieri (1996), Beck et al. (2004), Farber and Gowa (1997), Gartzke (2007), Gartzke and Weisiger (2014), Gowa (1999), Hegre (2000, 2003, 2014, Jervis (2002), Mousseau (2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013), Oneal and Russett (1997), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Rosecrance (1986), Souva (2003), Weede (1984, 2004), and Werner (2000) |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are much stronger’ | Bremer (1992), Caselli et al. (2015), Gelpi (1997), Oneal and Russett (1999a, b), and Peterson (2013) |
| ‘There is correlation, but only under certain specific conditions’ | Baliga et al. (2011), Bremer (1993), Bennett and Stam (1996), Farber and Gowa (1995), Gibler and Braithwaite (2013), Gibler and Miller (2013), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Gowa (2011), Jervis (2002), Mearsheimer (1990), Park (2013), Park and James (2015), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Reed (2000), Rosato (2003), Rosecrance (1986), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Siverson and Emmons (1991), and Weede (1984) |

### AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – Collective Action

#### Democracy fails to overcome collective action problems – populism and other self-defeating aspects are endemic, NOT backsliding

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VI. THE INTERLOCKING CRISES

In this Part, we highlight how the vulnerabilities of democracy are made salient as well as exacerbated by climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene. We also emphasize how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene place democracies that attempt to navigate them in a particularly impervious Scylla and Charybdis-like situation.173 The Scylla is ineffective policy; the Charybdis is some relaxation of the core democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Both options seem nearly guaranteed to trigger significant legitimacy challenges to liberal democratic systems.

Traditionally, two important sources of democratic legitimacy have been beneficial consequences, in the utilitarian tradition, and consent, in the social contract tradition.174 Whatever else may count as beneficial consequences, the capacity to solve problems that threaten the physical and social security of citizens is a central and important source of democratic legitimacy.175 Call this the “public utility” view of democratic legitimacy. And whatever else may count as consent, surely the fact that the majority of citizens have expressed their preference for a certain candidate, law, or policy is an important source of democratic legitimacy as well.176 Call this the “expressed preference” view of democratic legitimacy.

Consider public utility first. As we have pointed out, most contemporary democracies have thus far failed to address the emerging problems of the Anthropocene.177 Consequently, the sense of physical and social insecurity grows more acute amongst citizens as the problems mount and compound.178 The legitimacy of these democracies, and the supranational institutions they have created, such as the European Union and the United Nations, is thus compromised on public utility grounds.

Now consider expressed preference. The global scope, long-term reach, unprecedented features, and highly complex nature of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene require democracies to make robust commitments to multilateral cooperation, long-term planning, significant deviations from the status quo, and increased reliance on expert knowledge if they are to succeed in managing these problems. 179 Citizens’ expressed preferences may be quite distant from this network of commitments and activities,180 since the benefits of successfully managing a problem like climate change would mostly accrue not to these citizens, but to spatiotemporally distant people (i.e., the global poor and future generations) and genetically distant (non-human) nature. 181 Attempting to force such commitments, especially at a time when democracies are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens, can further compromise legitimacy.182

We thus face an apparent dilemma: if democracies fail to successfully address climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, their legitimacy will be challenged on public utility grounds. If they aggressively attempt to address them, their legitimacy will likely be challenged on expressed preference grounds. Either way, we can expect the power of populist figures and movements to grow.

The remainder of this Part illuminates this dilemma by discussing how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene interact with some further democratic vulnerabilities: weak multilateralism, short-termism, the profusion of veto players, the contested role of experts, and self-referring decision making.

A. Weak Multilateralism

Climate change cannot be successfully managed without a strong commitment to international cooperation.183 For a climate regime to succeed, it must be effective, perceived as at least not unfair by all parties, and otherwise acceptable to each party.184 At various times, the attempt to create a regime has foundered on each of these three considerations.185

From the beginning of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the FCCC in 1992 and in subsequent negotiations under the Convention, the question of fairness has been unavoidable.186 When agreements have been structured in ways that are acceptable to developing countries (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) they have been perceived as unfair by the United States.187 This has led to the weakening of commitments and to a regime whose effectiveness is in question.188 The Paris Agreement, by putting voluntary pledges at the center, was designed to avoid the problem of perceived unfairness.189 It was reasonably thought that no party could say that they had been unfairly treated when they have agreed to be measured in relation to a commitment that they have voluntarily undertaken and to which no sanctions are attached for non-compliance. 190 Nevertheless, that was exactly the claim made by President Trump in announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement.191 Moreover, the cost of creating an agreement to which no one could reasonably object was to create an Agreement whose effectiveness was in question even before the United States announced its intention to withdraw.192

While climate change is its own “full tragedy and weird comedy,” 193 there are structural issues at work.194 As the world order attempts to adjust to shifting power distributions following the emergence of new giants such as China and India, when it comes to problems such as climate change the cooperation of such countries is no longer just desirable but essential.195 As their collaboration becomes more valuable, the price for obtaining it rises accordingly.196 This complicates negotiations, and the problem seems only destined to worsen because this logic applies not only to presently emerging world powers, but also to those that have already emerged and those that will emerge in the future. As we observed in an earlier paper, “[g]lobal governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry, and this increases the price of obtaining cooperation from every country.”197

In addition, democracies have their own particular problems when it comes to multilateral agreements. Except in the rare case where they are able to steer multilateral agreements in the way they prefer, democratic governments “often seek to avoid compliance with binding multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship to their electorate.”198 This is in fact what happened in the case of President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement.199 The stated reason was the agreement’s unfairness to the United States.200 However, the deeper reason was that the Obama administration’s decision to join, although admittedly an act of national self-determination, was not in fact an authentic deliverance of American popular sovereignty, at least in the eyes of Trump and his supporters.201 According to Trump,

[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers – who [sic] I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.202

In the same speech Trump reminded his audience that “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”203

In democracies, it is ultimately citizens who empower their representatives to bargain and strike terms of international cooperation.204 Successfully addressing the problems of the Anthropocene is likely to require unprecedented levels of multilateralism.205 Democratic states that attempt to rise to the challenge are likely to face legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds. Those that do not may face legitimacy challenges on public utility grounds.

B. Short-termism

Short-termism can be defined as “the priority given to present net benefits at the cost of future ones.”206 Short-termism is a problem whenever policy domains have an extended timeframe, as is the case with climate change and other systemic problems of the Anthropocene.207 In these cases, present net benefits may need to be curtailed (through increases in taxes and regulations, for example) for the sake of benefits that might materialize in the distant future. These future benefits will then mostly advantage people other than those who have borne the costs. Reasons for privileging the present in these cases include pure time preference, uncertainty, and diminished or even null moral concern for those who might benefit in the future.208 The temptation, then, is to eschew the costs of the required policies and “pass the buck” to future generations.209

Short-termism is not always irrational nor morally wrong.210 It has been argued, however, that short-termism is both irrational and morally wrong in the case of climate change.211 The sources of short-termism are rooted in human psychology and can manifest in any kind of political regime.212 However, it has been argued that democracies are particularly vulnerable to short-termism.213

One important reason for the short-termism of democratic political regimes is that these regimes inherit, via voting and other forms of popular influence, their citizens’ biases in favor of the present. Policies may also reflect citizens’ misinformation about, or unawareness of, long-term processes, risks, policy aims, and possible outcomes.214 To counter these tendencies, liberal democracies typically filter their citizens’ inter-temporal biases, misinformation, and unawareness through such mechanisms as constitutions and reliance on expert bodies.215 Yet the more filtering they do, the more likely they are to incur legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds.216 This is a problem of intra-generational legitimacy.217

There are also problems of inter-generational legitimacy.218 There is no guarantee that long-term policies, if enacted, will achieve the anticipated aims, or that they will indeed make future people better off by achieving these aims.219 If things do not work out, these policies might be deemed illegitimate on public utility grounds by the very future people that they were supposed to benefit.220 In addition, such policies may be deemed illegitimate by future people on expressed preference grounds.221 Legitimacy on expressed preference grounds typically requires some form of authorization by those who are affected by policies, yet future people who will be affected by past policies never authorize them, nor can they hold anyone accountable.222

Another reason for democracies’ short-termism is the scheduling of participatory events.223 Democracy requires elections, which must be relatively frequent in order to ensure that people can regularly express their will, vote out politicians who are judged to have failed in some important ways, and prevent rent-seeking behavior by not giving politicians enough time to set up camp within institutions.224 However, the relatively short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are constantly concerned with their own reelection, and this may prevent them from taking hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital and do not produce appreciable outcomes in time for the next election.225 Because most of the impacts of climate change will largely materialize in the future and be felt by future generations, efforts at their alleviation must obey a clock that is not in sync with the electoral clock.

Note that there is no need to assume that politicians are always and necessarily motivated by only a thirst for power.226 In a democ- racy, even politicians who are exclusively motivated by the aspiration to make good long-term policy need to be elected or re-elected to do so.227 In order to be elected, they need to harness the votes of the current electorate.228 So, the problem of short-termism goes beyond a lack of conscientious far-sightedness on the side of politicians: it is structurally connected to the very fact of popular sovereignty—at least as long as the majority of people discount the future.229

C. Veto Players

Any political system (with the possible exclusion of some forms of anarchy) accords veto powers to some agent: a monarchy to the king, an aristocracy to the nobility, a technocracy to the experts, a theocracy to the religious leader, and so on.230 A veto player in a political system can be understood as an agent who can prevent a departure from the status quo.231 In democracies, veto players can be specified by constitutions (e.g., the President and the Congress in the United States), emerge from the political system (e.g., the Supreme Court in the United States, political parties that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe), or from civil society (e.g., powerful industries, unions or other interest groups in many countries).232

In a democracy, veto players can protect minority interests, prevent destabilizing change, and preserve important values and policies through periods in which they are unpopular.233 More generally, veto players prevent a democratic system from being excessively fluid and flexible.234 This is attractive when the status quo is desirable or an exogenous shock is beneficial; however, when the status quo is undesirable or an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable status quo, fluidity and flexibility are needed in order to respond quickly

and decisively.235 This is arguably the situation in the case of climate

change, which demands nimble political responses to which veto

players would have to acquiesce.

The presence of many veto players threatens to delay or even block the formulation and implementation of policy.236 Liberal democracies, with their reliance on checks and balances generated by institutional architecture or by competition among interest groups, seem particularly vulnerable to such threats—and the more veto players in a democracy the greater the degree of vulnerability.237

An especially high concentration of veto players helps to explain why a powerful, rich, technological leader like the United States is uncannily slow to address consequential public issues such as the politics of distribution, racial equality, immigration, the proper balance between liberty and national security, and of course climate change.238 The United States Constitution separates powers in the federal government, reserves a broad range of powers to states and includes a bill of rights that can be viewed as effectively giving veto powers to individuals in some circumstances. Practices have also developed through time that inhibit action, such as requiring supermajorities for some political decisions.

The profusion of veto players may be extreme in the United States, but it is a feature common to many liberal democracies that often makes political action elusive even on relatively minor policy issues.239 For every possible policy change, there is always a “do-nothing” alternative (sometimes more respectably presented as a “wait and see” alternative) that is invariably attractive to some veto player.240

“Do-nothing” alternatives may sometimes be justified on grounds of rational choice considerations relating to transition costs and uncertainty about both the process of transition and the final pay-off structure.241 Veto players give voice to such considerations, as well as other considerations that we have already noted.242 But veto players may also give voice to less rational tendencies, which are inevitably present and, in democracies, are crystallized in votes. Among these tendencies may be disproportionate attention to sunk costs, finding refuge in “what has always worked,” fear of regretting the changes made, the desire to maintain and transmit a sense of control by not acceding to the demands of new circumstances, and lack of trust in those who are proposing the changes.243

Veto players tend to slow down or block deviations from the status quo, and this makes it difficult to tackle climate change and other similar problems of the Anthropocene.244 But veto players also reflect and configure real structures of power, and protect and promote the needs and interests of actual people.245 When the number of veto players or the importance of specific veto players is altered, new power structures emerge and this can raise legitimacy challenges on both utility and expressed preference grounds.246 It is not obvious what veto players should be eliminated or demoted in order to produce more nimble and effective climate policy, and which ones should be given additional power instead. Nor is it obvious who should decide the answers to these questions (if not the people) and on what grounds (if not majority rule).

Veto players configure systems of checks and balances, filters and buffers, which are only partially exposed to popular influence.247 This anti-majoritarian service is particularly precious to liberal democracies, which rely on veto players to protect and promote the rights of individuals and minorities—and, with that, the core liberal principles of individual liberty and human rights. However, as a consequence, if a majority exists that is overwhelmingly convinced by climate science, totally in favor of leaving all remaining fossil energy sources in the ground, and ready to embark on ambitious renewable energy programs, this majority may still find it difficult to act. Liberal democracies protect minorities of various kinds in varying degrees, and these include climate change denialists and those who profit from fossil fuels. Economically powerful and en- trenched economic minorities (the “1%”) are often extremely effective veto players.248 This can prevent action that would benefit most people, thus increasing the risks of legitimacy challenges.

D. Contested Role of Experts

Climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene are unprecedented phenomena whose complexity and implications are only beginning to be understood by scientists and other experts. Climate change is a multidimensional problem that concerns and connects ecology, demography, development, production, consumption, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban planning, mobility, migration, and more, in novel ways.249 It poses threats that are multi-scalar, probabilistic, indirect, often invisible, spatiotemporally unbound, and potentially catastrophic. These threats challenge our reason, emotions, and imagination.250 If there were ever a complex problem that required expert knowledge, it is climate change.

Liberal democracies make significant use of expert knowledge in policymaking in various ways to protect liberal values, and to boost their efficiency, equity, and political stability.251 Expert knowledge is distinguished from non-expert opinion through such criteria as experience, professional and educational qualifications, peer-review, and rules of evidence.252

Still, in a democracy, differences in expertise do not translate to differences in political authority, for much the same reason why differences in lineage do not translate in this way. A democratic citizen can recognize expertise and accept the science of, say, climate change, and still object to the expert who counsels some course of action: “You may be right, but who made you boss?”253 In a democracy, expertise is always subservient to the voice of the people (pace Plato, philosophers cannot be kings).254

For this reason, the relationships between experts and ordinary citizens are always potentially fraught in a democracy. These relationships vary from country to country, time to time, and issue to issue. Often, the relationships are placid in good times and rocky in hard times. Major policy failures, such as the global financial crisis of 2008 and the spreading of terrorist radicalization in many European Union countries, can lead citizens to question experts’ knowledge and see them as just another interest group seeking rents at people’s expense.255

In the case of climate change, an additional element makes the role of experts potentially unpopular. Climate science, in our present social context, inevitably provokes fundamental questions about how we ought to live and organize our societies, throwing doubt on the ways in which we do so now. A particularly powerful and widespread attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance through various forms of rationalization may thus come into play. After all, if something potentially catastrophic such as climate change can result from the very ways in which we live our everyday lives—how we dwell, how we eat, how we make things, how we move around—the nagging thought is that there might be something fundamentally wrong about the ways in which we live. These are not comfortable thoughts and can lead to resentment or worse towards those who bear the message.

The incipient conflict and simmering resentment has been exploited by powerful interests who look to be the immediate losers from a transition to a more sustainable way of life. They stoke the dissonance and encourage denialism. The most obvious manifestation of this is the climate change denial campaign, directed towards preventing the formation of a consensus for political action on climate change.256

The main strategy of climate change denialists has been to suppress both belief in the science and belief that there is a scientific consensus on the existence, anthropogenic nature, and dangerousness of climate change.257 In its aims and strategies, climate change denialism has replicated earlier forms of denialism involving tobacco smoking, acid rain, DDT, and ozone depletion. 258

The rhetorical techniques adopted by climate change denialism have also not been particularly original: versions of these techniques were used in all the other cases mentioned above. These techniques include attacking sources rather than discussing evidence, “moving the goalpost” by requesting ever larger amounts of evidence, submitting false evidence, suggesting false equivalences or analogies, confusing ignorance about mechanisms or processes with ignorance about facts or outcomes, cherry-picking anomalies, selective skepticism, quote mining, and the so-called “Gish gallop”—overwhelming discussants or audiences with unscientific claims to make it difficult to counter all the misinformation at once.259

What is new about denialism in the Anthropocene is not its strategies or tactics, but its amplification. Expertise denialism now travels through social media, which allows for unfiltered instant communication among citizens and between citizens and representatives. Traditional intermediaries—political parties, intellectuals, and the professional press—are increasingly made redundant by these technologies. Indeed, to maintain their relevance (and market share), these traditional intermediaries often seek to replicate the immediacy and excitement of social media, compromising their own claims to epistemological or institutional privilege.

One effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is an increased tendency to brand political ideas and policy proposals and to market them as products.260 The need to engage audiences with arguments and relevant facts—and even to maintain consistency in one’s opinions— decreases, while the need for a good, resonant, quick-win pitch increases. With that, the importance of expert knowledge is downplayed to the advantage of skilled branding and marketing.

Another effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is a polarizing fragmentation, not just at the level of policy judgments, but also regarding the sets of facts to which different individuals and groups make reference. Social media allows for networked, yet highly fragmented, political communication, making it harder to individuate and even debate a common story.261

Much empirical work in psychology, economics, political science, sociology, and communications has gone into trying to explain how and why disagreement about facts can occur.262 The explanation seems to be some sort of “biased assimilation,” whereby people adjust their view of facts with reference to their self-defining values, social identities, and partisan allegiances.263 Experiments on reception suggest that individuals selectively credit or dismiss information in a manner that reinforces beliefs congenial to their values.264 These experiments found that subjects were substantially more likely to count a scientist as an authoritative “expert” when the scientist was depicted as taking a position consistent with the subjects’ cultural predispositions, than when that scientist took a contrary position.265 Interestingly, these tendencies seem to be directly, rather than inversely, related to levels of science literacy and general education of experimental subjects: the more equipped people are to know and understand the facts, the more they disagree on them.266

In times of social media, these tendencies may be amplified, insofar as individuals tend to gravitate towards and engage mostly with resonant networks of “like-me’s” that by and large reaffirm their own values and perspectives.267 This may tribalize positions and impede constructive democratic engagement and debate from ever taking off on many contested issues. In addition, one can expect increasing polarization to also be fomented by individuals and groups trying to secure loyalty to their branded political ideas and policy proposals in this way.

The internet and other media, with their seemingly endless resources, create the impression that expertise can be picked and chosen at will, thereby feeding the perception of public life as a spectacle.268 Public discussions, unfiltered by “moderators,” unfold in a denuded space stripped of epistemological norms.269 In the United States at least, this has morphed into a generalized atmosphere of expertise denialism writ large. Denialism about evolution, vaccines, economics, and more has become commonplace.270

It is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of adopting epistemological nihilism as a public epistemology.271 No commitment to facts, in the traditional sense, or even consistency of opinion, is required.272 Truth is what the speaker says it is, here and now. In a moment it may be different, depending on what the speaker can get away with. In a democracy, it is up to elections or approval ratings to resolve disagreements. It is a short step from here to other exercises of power.

The nihilistic turn in public epistemology threatens the legitimacy of democracy, for democracy cannot solve the problems it faces without mobilizing epistemological authority that is itself hostage to popular vote. As difficult as this challenge may be in favorable times, it is greatly magnified in the face of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene.

E. Self-referring Decision-making

What we have elsewhere called the “agency presupposition” is deeply entrenched in modern democratic theory. This presupposition holds “that the political community is constituted by agents who initiate and conduct political action, and who themselves, and their interests and welfare, are what matter politically.”273 The agency presupposition arose at a time in which democratic principles, norms and institutions were being developed to govern relations between agents who lived in close proximity to one another in space and time, and whose decisions and actions had relatively direct impacts on each other. However, around 1950, a profound change occurred from a world of discrete but interdependent states to a world of shared social space in which distant events have localized impacts and vice-versa. In this globalized world, the fates of nation-states and their peoples became not just effectively interdependent, but also structurally interconnected, with social, political, and economic activities, interactions, and infrastructures stretching beyond political frontiers, leading to a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global.274 Political decisions and actions taken locally (in selected powerful countries, many of which were democratic) now systematically had planetary implications, impacting for better or worse the welfare and interests of people in all corners of the world.

With the Anthropocene disruption of earth’s fundamental ecological systems, including those that govern climate, political agents (living humans who can initiate and conduct political action) have gained unprecedented power over a vast universe of non-agents that comprises animate and inanimate nature as well as those living on the periphery of both space and time.275 The circle of affected nonagents has expanded beyond cultural, genetic, and spatiotemporal boundaries to include virtually everything on the planet, now extended indefinitely in time.276 This establishes an enormous asymmetry of power. Those on the periphery, and nature, cannot initiate and conduct political action: they cannot reciprocate, they cannot participate, they cannot protest, they cannot retaliate.277 In democratic terms, they do not matter—or only matter derivatively, if political agents care about their fate. And it is as undemocratic as can be, particularly if the democracy in question is a liberal democracy, to force political agents to care if they do not.278

A phenomenon like climate change creates ubiquitous tensions and trade-offs between agents and non-agents—those who are governed, and those who are affected.279 The latter will suffer most from climate change, but a democracy responsive to the claims of future generations (or those living beyond its borders, or nonhuman nature) may often have to forgo opportunities for bringing beneficial consequences to those who empower it with their votes.280 Instead, democratic leaders would have to enact policies favoring the interests of those who do not vote because they do not yet exist (or live in different countries or are not human).

Democracies making policies that favor non-agents will expose themselves to intra-generational legitimacy challenges on both public utility grounds and expressed preference grounds.281 Even if the expected benefits to non-agents were great, such non-agent-oriented policies might not win the hearts, minds, and guts of living human agents who may express their preference for themselves instead— particularly in democracies that are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens.282 Many believe that ignoring or heavily discounting the welfare and interests of non-agents is morally wrong, but if expressed preference is important, it may be a wrong that democracies cannot avoid committing.283

The agency presupposition makes government responsive to those who are governed but not to those who are affected beyond borders in space, time, citizenship, or genetic make-up. A basic presupposition of liberal democracy appears to be threatened by the very actions that would have to be taken to express concern for all those affected by the climate-changing and eco-altering actions of its citizens.

VII. CONCLUSION

We began this Article by explaining the notion of the Anthropocene and briefly telling the story of failed responses to climate change. We went on to discuss the uneasy relationship between climate change and democracy, focusing on liberal democracy in particular. We presented some basic aspects of democratic theory and practice, and discussed some of democracy’s main vulnerabilities. We showed how in the Anthropocene these vulnerabilities can magnify, leading to legitimacy challenges.

These legitimacy challenges are not new. Democracy has always been haunted by anxiety about its future. Some political theorists have argued that democracy is the only form of political organization that underwrites the seeds of its own destruction.284 Demagogues and extremists who wish to blow up the state are allowed the same freedoms as those who seek to manage it more fairly and effectively. The risk of a democratically enabled democide is not an abstract or counterfactual risk: the executioners of German democracy came to power through the rules and procedures of the Weimar Republic.285 If we open our eyes, we may see these stories going on around us today.

Modern democracy is, in many respects, the most sophisticated articulation of the human capacity for social organization. It is also the most hospitable environment for the expression of human values that, through centuries of emancipatory struggles, have come to be regarded as fundamental, such as individual liberty and political equality.286 Our objective in this Article is not to write a requiem for democracy, but rather to chart the seas that democratic theory and practice will have to navigate in order to successfully address climate change and survive the challenges of the Anthropocene. We have highlighted the vulnerabilities of democracy in order to throw in sharp relief the many challenges entailed by the voyage, not to discourage it. Democracy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient in the past, and it may well succeed in rising to these challenges as well. There are those who think that democracy doesn’t stand a chance.287 But many still believe that the only solution to the problems of the Anthropocene lies in more, better, or different democracy.288 And there are those who think that even if democracy fails these challenges, democracy itself will not have failed. For they see its value as intrinsic, and not just as a means to better or more effective governance.289

It is difficult to sketch the nature of possible democratic solutions to some of the issues that we have raised, and we will not try to do so here. Instead, we will close with a summary of what seems to be the main challenge ahead. The existing democratic deficits in liberal countries will generally have to be reduced. Yet, in the case of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, liberal democratic countries will have to muster both the internal coherence and strength to better resist populism, and the external coherence and strength to be more cooperative partners within the framework of supranational institutions. This is necessary because, in the Anthropocene, the global spills into the domestic and vice-versa: a globally changing climate may have pernicious local impacts on the territory and population of any given country, while political dysfunction in one country can cripple [halt] efforts at global governance.

The democracies of the Anthropocene will have to work at multiple scales in both space and time, incorporating the interests of the global with those of the local, and those of the future with those of the present. This seems to suggest, perhaps paradoxically, that the democracies of the Anthropocene will have to be more democratic in some respects and less democratic in others. The relation between popular sovereignty and institutions that limit popular sovereignty while respecting it is a tug-of-war in democratic theory and practice that has been going on for millennia, and is now being put to unprecedented tests.

Liberal democracies, in particular, have an enormous amount at stake. Liberal political theory has always recognized the right to resist and even overthrow illegitimate political power.290 This right has been used to justify historical events that liberals typically applaud, including the Glorious Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution.291 Despite their failures and excesses, these revolutions forwarded liberal values and helped to entrench them in institutions. Unable to find consistent responses to challenges to their own legitimacy in the Anthropocene, liberal democracies may be in danger of warranting revolutions against themselves and the very institutions that should realize their values. They may become the ancient regime.

### AT: NB – AT: Terror !

#### No nuclear terror and no impact

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The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

In order to put the numbers in some context, it has often been pointed out that far more Americans are killed each year not only by such highly destructive hazards as drug overdoses or automobile accidents, but even by such comparatively minor ones as lightning, accident-causing deer, peanut allergies, or drowning in bathtubs. Some comparisons are arrayed in Table 1.

In recent years, however, critics have attacked what they call “the bathtub fallacy.” 5

First, they stress that it is important to keep in mind that bathtubs are not out to kill you while terrorism is a willful act carried out by diabolical, dedicated, and clever human beings. Thus, although the number of people Islamist terrorists have been able to kill in the West since 9/11 has thus far been quite limited, those terrorists, as they plot and plan and learn from experience, may very well become far more destructive in the future.

Second, the critics charge that the comparison of terrorism with bathtub drownings is incomplete in that it doesn’t consider the possibility that the incidence of terrorist destruction is low precisely because counterterrorism measures are so effective.

Third, it is argued that, unlike bathtub drownings, terrorism exacts costs far beyond those entailed in the event itself. It damagingly sows terror, fear, and anxiety; disturbs our

Table

Description automatically generated

psychological well-being; undermines trust and openness within the society; and reduces our sense of intrinsic moral worth even as it increases a sense of helplessness. They maintain, fourth, that the comparison is invalid because, unlike terrorism, bathtubs provide benefit.

And finally, they contend that terrorism costs are peculiarly high, particularly in a democratic society, because the fears it generates will necessarily need to be serviced by policy makers, and this pressure forces, or inspires, them to adopt countermeasures, both foreign and domestic, that are costly and sometimes even excessive.

In this article, we examine these five propositions and find all of them to be wanting. In the process, we conclude that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage.

Terrorism is willed and may well become more destructive

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested that “the fear of terrorism isn’t motivated solely by what terrorists have done, but what terrorists hope to do.” Bathtubs are simply not “engaged in a conspiracy with other bathtubs to murder ever-larger numbers of Americans.” However, terrorists “in the Islamist orbit,” he insists, “seek unconventional weapons that would allow them to kill a far-larger number of Americans than died on Sept. 11.” 6 Or as Janan Ganesh of the Financial Times puts it, “Bathroom deaths could multiply by 50 without a threat to civil order. The incidence of terror could not.” 7

Thus far, 9/11 stands out as an extreme outlier: scarcely any terrorist act, before or after, in war zones or outside them, has inflicted even one-tenth as much total destruction. That is, contrary to common expectations, the attack has thus far been an aberration, not a harbinger.8 And al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the attack, has, in some respects at least, proved to resemble President John Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—an entity of almost trivial proportions that got horribly lucky once. The tiny group of perhaps 100 or so does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists. They may have done some training, may have contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan. In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since 9/11, Mitchell Silber finds only two—the shoe bomber attempt of 2001 and the effort to blow up transatlantic airliners with liquid bombs in 2006—that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaeda central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances, both of which, as it happens, failed miserably.9 And, although some al-Qaeda affiliates have committed substantial damage in the Middle East, usually in the context of civil wars, their efforts to carry out terrorism in the West have been rare and completely ineffective.10 Even under siege, it is difficult to see why al-Qaeda could not have carried out attacks at least as costly and shocking as the shooting rampages (organized by other groups) that took place in Mumbai in 2008 or at a shopping center in Kenya in 2013. Neither took huge resources, presented major logistical challenges, required the organization of a large number of perpetrators, or needed extensive planning.

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” 11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the elevenyear period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These oft-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.” 13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14

More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.” 15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.18

#### No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770969> /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

It is important to note that scientific advances and the emergence of new technologies are not the only, or even the most important, factors influencing the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring and using CBRN weapons. Thankfully, the number of terrorist groups motivated to acquire these weapons has been limited, despite many that have the requisite technical and financial resources.60 The vast majority of terrorist groups have been satisfied with conventional weapons such as guns and bombs. The surprising rise of the Islamic State and their repeated use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, however, serve as a reminder that it only takes one group with the intent and capability to acquire and use CBRN weapons to pose a threat to international security.61

In addition, the ability of a terrorist group to convert CBRN-related material into a weapon depends on intangible factors such as tacit knowledge (the unarticulated knowledge that can only be gained through hands-on, trial-and-error experience or mentorship), the ability of the group to create and share such knowledge, and its ability to assemble and successfully manage interdisciplinary teams.62 Terrorist groups, especially those facing pressure from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, have had difficulties recruiting, retaining, and effectively utilizing individuals with the right combination of scientific, technical, and organizational skills to develop effective CBRN weapons.

Developing a CBRN weapon capable of causing mass casualties is also a very complex process. A scientific breakthrough that makes developing or acquiring one component of a weapon easier might not have any impact on the other stages in the weaponization process. Thus, the impact of a single scientific breakthrough or a novel technology on the acquisition of a CBRN weapon should not be exaggerated. For example, synthetic biology might make it easier for a non-state actor to create a pathogen, but that technology does not help terrorists improve their ability to disseminate the pathogen on a large scale.63

Likewise, it is important to assess the specific contributions that a particular technology can make to a specific aspect of the CBRN threat in practice, not just in theory. In the case of 3D printing, this manufacturing technology is not appropriate for working with metals that are toxic or radioactive. While microreactors are well-suited to covertly producing small quantities of highly pure chemicals, they are not well-suited to the production of most chemical warfare agents and precursors due to excessive heat generated by their synthesis and by the production of solid byproducts that would clog the microfluidic channels at the heart of this technology.64

Finally, advances in science and technology represent not just threats, but also opportunities to make it harder for terrorist groups to acquire CBRN weapons. Unmanned aerial and ground vehicles can be used for border security, CBRN weapon detection, and bomb disposal. For example, the EU is sponsoring the development of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to investigate CBRN crime scenes under the ROCSAFE project.65 Biometrics and radio frequency ID chips can be used to improve physical security measures and inventory control to prevent unauthorized access to CBRN materials. Advances in science and technology are also leading to improved sensors that can be used to detect the production, transportation, and use of CBRN weapons. The development of dedicated laboratories and new techniques to analyze CBRN materials has also contributed to impressive advances in nuclear, biological, and chemical forensics, which are crucial for attribution.66

### AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

#### No risk of miscalc

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

Counterterrorism can certainly explain U.S. intervention in Mali; however, enabling French success explains the timeline. More importantly, the case of U.S.-supported French intervention in Mali is illustrative of the role the United States plays in supporting developed countries. France is the latest developed country to need U.S. assistance, but requests like this are common. This is true for almost every one of the 50 countries serving in Afghanistan today, as it was true with European countries in the Balkans, Australian forces in East Timor, and British forces in West Africa. These examples highlight that the foreign policy goals of many developed countries exceed their military capacity, which requires them to rely on the U.S. military for assistance. As developed countries’ defense budgets fall further, reliance on the United States is going to increase. This remains a decades-old frustration. Most recently, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense, while living up to our responsibilities."7

Pragmatically, the United States would like its partners to do more, but shared challenges and limited budgets will reinforce the value of American logistics, combat experience, and intelligence capacity. Further, American support of other countries reinforces the treaty arrangements with 27 NATO countries and five Asian countries. Twenty years ago, there seemed to be little relevance to these treaties and security arrangements, let alone a rationale for invoking them or expanding them. Yet, the opposite occurred. NATO increased its membership three times from 16 to 19 in 1999, again to 26 in 2006, and again to 28 in 2009. At the same time the number of NATO members increased, NATO changed from its traditional mission of territorial defense to one of global security engagement. With each expansion, new members require training and equipping to NATO standards. With each new operation, NATO countries require access to U.S. intelligence, critical technology, and global logistics.

In addition to formal treaties of alliance, an additional dozen countries are offered protection under the U.S. security umbrella either by law, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or by policy such as United States’ support for Israel.8 These protections include provisions to train and equip their militaries. Another dozen countries are offered special security provisions through Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. MNNA does not confer a mutual defense relationship, but the largely symbolic act implies a close working relationship with another country's defense forces.9 It is more akin to a preferred buyer’s program allowing countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea access to advanced weapons systems. With weapons purchases also come long-term training and maintenance contracts. From a U.S. perspective, it has a comparative advantage in defense exports; strategically, programs like these are intended to overcome the free-rider problem the United States faces with its partners.10 For every Joint Strike Fighter Japan buys, the United States can deploy one less to northeast Asia.

Given the diplomatic nature of these security partnerships, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs focuses these activities, regulates the defense trade and arms transfers to reinforce the military capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners, and ensures that the transfer of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interests. Further, the Bureau promotes regional security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue, as well as through the provision of security assistance to friendly countries and international peacekeeping efforts. The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations (e.g., South Korea), and preventing crisis and conflict (e.g., facilitating Colombia’s success against the decades-old FARC insurgency). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and the Camp David Accords.11 Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that it seeks to strengthen it and not undermine it.12

One reason the United States concentrates assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international special operations exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute, attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Given the significant U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s military and police training infrastructure, it is likely that Afghanistan could eventually host regional training if the insurgency subsides to acceptable levels. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. We see the benefits of this today where U.S.-trained Colombian pilots are training Mexican pilots in Colombia.

**[Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. International Assistance (Account 150) OMITTED]**

In addition to the Department of State budget for security assistance, the Defense Department directly funds security assistance through section 1206/7 and other command funds such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This authority did provoke more concern about militarizing foreign policy; however, this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Further, U.S. ambassadors must approve all programs. Thus, the Department of State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels through the embassy country team.

CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

With national security focused on weak states and persistent security concerns among stable allies like South Korea, the U.S. military has been changing over the last 20 years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy. In some sense, this turns the idea of militarization of foreign policy on its head; the Pentagon is being demilitarized and valued for its ability to impart military capabilities to U.S. partners.

Given the current structure of the international system and technological advances, the United States does not need partners in the same way as it did in the past where they provided direct benefits through coaling stations, maintenance facilities, or large bases. While the number of forward bases is still substantial, the number of forward deployed forces are greatly reduced. More importantly, the nature of the presence has changed; the United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g., assistance to Colombia’s military) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g., future basing in Australia). It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to support the global demand for peacekeepers.14 The United States certainly gets increased access to countries around the world through these programs, but given the overwhelming military dominance of the United States, it does not abuse these relationships or ignore seemingly insignificant states. Instead, it seeks to create partners where sovereignty is respected and all parties derive benefits. The latest example of this is U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as dictated by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

#### No impact – wouldn’t escalate

Quinlan 9 Michael Quinlan, former British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State, *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons*, 2009, p.63-69 /GoGreen!

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

### AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

#### No readiness decline

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

Counterterrorism can certainly explain U.S. intervention in Mali; however, enabling French success explains the timeline. More importantly, the case of U.S.-supported French intervention in Mali is illustrative of the role the United States plays in supporting developed countries. France is the latest developed country to need U.S. assistance, but requests like this are common. This is true for almost every one of the 50 countries serving in Afghanistan today, as it was true with European countries in the Balkans, Australian forces in East Timor, and British forces in West Africa. These examples highlight that the foreign policy goals of many developed countries exceed their military capacity, which requires them to rely on the U.S. military for assistance. As developed countries’ defense budgets fall further, reliance on the United States is going to increase. This remains a decades-old frustration. Most recently, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense, while living up to our responsibilities."7

Pragmatically, the United States would like its partners to do more, but shared challenges and limited budgets will reinforce the value of American logistics, combat experience, and intelligence capacity. Further, American support of other countries reinforces the treaty arrangements with 27 NATO countries and five Asian countries. Twenty years ago, there seemed to be little relevance to these treaties and security arrangements, let alone a rationale for invoking them or expanding them. Yet, the opposite occurred. NATO increased its membership three times from 16 to 19 in 1999, again to 26 in 2006, and again to 28 in 2009. At the same time the number of NATO members increased, NATO changed from its traditional mission of territorial defense to one of global security engagement. With each expansion, new members require training and equipping to NATO standards. With each new operation, NATO countries require access to U.S. intelligence, critical technology, and global logistics.

In addition to formal treaties of alliance, an additional dozen countries are offered protection under the U.S. security umbrella either by law, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or by policy such as United States’ support for Israel.8 These protections include provisions to train and equip their militaries. Another dozen countries are offered special security provisions through Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. MNNA does not confer a mutual defense relationship, but the largely symbolic act implies a close working relationship with another country's defense forces.9 It is more akin to a preferred buyer’s program allowing countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea access to advanced weapons systems. With weapons purchases also come long-term training and maintenance contracts. From a U.S. perspective, it has a comparative advantage in defense exports; strategically, programs like these are intended to overcome the free-rider problem the United States faces with its partners.10 For every Joint Strike Fighter Japan buys, the United States can deploy one less to northeast Asia.

Given the diplomatic nature of these security partnerships, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs focuses these activities, regulates the defense trade and arms transfers to reinforce the military capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners, and ensures that the transfer of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interests. Further, the Bureau promotes regional security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue, as well as through the provision of security assistance to friendly countries and international peacekeeping efforts. The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations (e.g., South Korea), and preventing crisis and conflict (e.g., facilitating Colombia’s success against the decades-old FARC insurgency). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and the Camp David Accords.11 Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that it seeks to strengthen it and not undermine it.12

One reason the United States concentrates assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international special operations exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute, attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Given the significant U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s military and police training infrastructure, it is likely that Afghanistan could eventually host regional training if the insurgency subsides to acceptable levels. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. We see the benefits of this today where U.S.-trained Colombian pilots are training Mexican pilots in Colombia.

**[Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. International Assistance (Account 150) OMITTED]**

In addition to the Department of State budget for security assistance, the Defense Department directly funds security assistance through section 1206/7 and other command funds such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This authority did provoke more concern about militarizing foreign policy; however, this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Further, U.S. ambassadors must approve all programs. Thus, the Department of State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels through the embassy country team.

CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

With national security focused on weak states and persistent security concerns among stable allies like South Korea, the U.S. military has been changing over the last 20 years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy. In some sense, this turns the idea of militarization of foreign policy on its head; the Pentagon is being demilitarized and valued for its ability to impart military capabilities to U.S. partners.

Given the current structure of the international system and technological advances, the United States does not need partners in the same way as it did in the past where they provided direct benefits through coaling stations, maintenance facilities, or large bases. While the number of forward bases is still substantial, the number of forward deployed forces are greatly reduced. More importantly, the nature of the presence has changed; the United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g., assistance to Colombia’s military) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g., future basing in Australia). It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to support the global demand for peacekeepers.14 The United States certainly gets increased access to countries around the world through these programs, but given the overwhelming military dominance of the United States, it does not abuse these relationships or ignore seemingly insignificant states. Instead, it seeks to create partners where sovereignty is respected and all parties derive benefits. The latest example of this is U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as dictated by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

#### No impact to readiness

George 99 James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/is-military-readiness-overrated> /GoGreen!

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness.

#### No impact to readiness

John Mueller 21, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, "Proliferation, Terrorism, Humanitarian Intervention, and Other Problems," in The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 7, 02/17/2021, pg. 183-184.

Over the course of the last several decades, alarmists have often focused on potential dangers presented by rogue states, as they came to be called in the 1990s. These were led by such devils du jour as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro, Gaddafi, Khomeini, Kim Il-sung, Saddam Hussein, Milosˇevic´, and Ahmadinijad, all of whom have since faded into history’s dustbin.66 Today the alarm has been directed at Iran as discussed in Chapter 6 and also at North Korea as discussed in this one. However, neither country really threatens to commit major direct military aggression. Iran, in fact, has eschewed the practice for several centuries.

Nonetheless, it might make some sense to maintain a capacity to institute containment and deterrence efforts carried out in formal or informal coalition with concerned neighboring countries – and there are quite a few of these in each case. However, the military requirements for effective containment by their neighbors, by the United States, and by the broader world community are far from monumental and do not necessarily require the United States to maintain large forces-in-being for the remote eventuality.

This is suggested by the experience with the Gulf War of 1991 when military force was successfully applied to deal with a rogue venture – the conquest by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq of neighboring Kuwait. As noted earlier, Iraq’s invasion was rare to the point of being unique: it was the only case since World War II in which one United Nations country has invaded another with the intention of incorporating it into its own territory. It scarcely appears, as laid out in Chapter 3, that Iraq’s pathetic forces required a large force to be thrown at them to decide to withdraw: over a period of half a year, they did not erect anything resembling an effective defensive system and, when the chips were down, they proved to lack not only defenses, but strategy, tactics, leadership, and morale as well.

Countries opposed to provocative rogue behavior do not need to have a large force-in-being because there would be plenty of time to build one up (should it come to that) if other measures such as economic sanctions and diplomatic forays (including appeasement) fail to persuade.

### Deficit – Capacity

#### No capacity – and their personnel reform plank just means incompetent contractors

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, <http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf> /GoGreen!

Title 10 vs. Title 22. State perceives authority to have shifted in two basic ways: 1) new DoD authorities (i.e. 2282) that undercut State’s lead responsibility for security assistance planning, and 2) new DoD authorities that extend beyond assistance to “armed forces,” whereby DoD now has authority to train non-security forces. Generally speaking, Defense sees this as a necessary evolution of the security assistance system given the shifting nature of global threats. Specifically, Defense sees Title 22 authorities as diplomatic in nature, focused on relationship building as they have always been. By contrast, DoD sees the new Title 10 authorities as critical to filling real capability gaps that have a direct connection to U.S. national security interests. Moreover, they cite, in a time of significant budget constraints, increasing pressure and need to rely on partners and coalitions in this way. Finally, a very real connection exists between Title 10 and Title 22 authority growth and the relative level of activity (or inactivity) between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. State has not seen an authorizations bill in a decade, and the evolution of their authorities has not kept pace with the evolution of Defense committees. Many of the State authorities are relatively outdated, but their committees have not been successful in moving State authorization legislation through the system. Finally, and above all, Defense continues to stress the pragmatic urgency of the current situation, and State’s inability (due to lack of resources, not incompetence) to do industrial scale security cooperation work. For instance, Defense personnel typically concede that it is undesirable for U.S. military forces to be training civilian security personnel, but that this is better than it not being done, or the training being done by incompetent contractors.

### Deficit – DoS Bureaucracy

#### DoS internal turf wars gut solvency and thump the net benefit – and reforms won’t solve

Ross 17 Tommy Ross, senior associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Congressional Oversight on Security Assistance,” Commentary, 9-26-2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/congressional-oversight-security-assistance> /GoGreen!

Who’s in charge? As the Obama administration issued and then sought to implement Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance, and as DoD’s security assistance profile has grown in recent years, debates both within and outside the government have recently been asking the “who’s in charge” question from an interagency perspective. Yet, the question is equally—and perhaps more—important inside the State Department itself.

Responsibility for security assistance is muddled and disjointed. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) leads a planning process around FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, but the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources makes final decisions about funding allocations, and regional bureaus exercise substantial influence on how resources are divvied up within their assigned regions. PM’s power can seem to range somewhere between facilitation and administration.

Complicating matters further, other functional bureaus—such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau and the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation—control significant security assistance resources, such as program funding under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) accounts. Yet another major aid program, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, is controlled by regional bureaus.

Developing integrated, holistic plans for security assistance across all these bureaus, which all report to different undersecretaries, is nearly impossible. There are numerous countries in which four or five different security assistance programs may be funding activities in the same general area (for example, maritime security) with competing objectives and limited awareness of other activities. And, in the current organization, there is no one sufficiently empowered to arbitrate conflicts between bureaus below the level of deputy secretary, the #2 official in the department.

Even as the Trump administration considers major reforms to the State Department bureaucracy, this muddle is not expected to improve considerably. Disjointed, uncoordinated programming risks strategic failure, redundancy, and waste; the question of who’s in charge thus becomes critically important. The committee would do well to press State Department leaders to begin sorting out the answer.

### Deficit – Conditionality

#### Our advantages are military in nature – subordinating them to State’s quixotic values crusades independently tanks solvency

Sadler 21 Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation, MA Jochi University, MS National War College; and Janae Diaz, member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation; “Don’t Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.,” Breaking Defense, 6-28-2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/dont-shift-security-cooperation-to-state-dept/> /GoGreen!

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department.

That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged.

Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

In the existing system, State consults with Defense on its security assistance designs. Defense then implements State programs, as well as its own security cooperation programs, such as multinational military exercises and military training and advising.

The departments differ in the scope to which they apply security assistance. Defense programs target narrower national security objectives, such as the Maritime Security Initiative, launched in 2015 to expand maritime domain awareness. State’s programs, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, emphasize broader regional stability and humanitarian goals.

Assistance programs can be better tailored to their objectives when State shares directive authority and decision-making power with the entity most relevant to each program’s purpose. For example, when the objective is military capacity-building, the Defense Department should be an equal partner; when the goal is justice system reform, the Department of Justice should be a full partner.

Consider how the Philippines used American-sourced coast guard cutters when responding to China’s intrusions at Whitsun Reef earlier this year. Given President Biden’s emphasis on strategic competition with China, strengthening partner nations to resist Beijing’s maritime coercion should be a no-brainer. In this context, State should ensure it ties the objectives of its weapons sales program to Defense Department priorities, such as improving maritime domain awareness, by enabling the Philippines and, perhaps other countries, to increase patrols of exclusive economic zones.

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations.

Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging — or compelling — State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

Congress should recognize and re-evaluate its role in these decision as well, as legislative earmarks can limit State’s directive agility and responsiveness. But even the best-laid plans cannot succeed without follow-through.

### Deficit – Delay

#### Massive delay

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department:

The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority

The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund

This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy.

Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency.